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ABSTRACT 
 Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist 
despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium 
from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is 
comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or 
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of 
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting 
mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output.  According to this 
model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will 
increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my 
hypothesis, I implement a theory-guided case study. My first case encompasses the positive 
feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second case 
discusses the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. The goal 
of this study is to explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of 
negative feedback that stabilizes the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated. 
 
 为什么在这六十五年来，中国和台湾的关系还在弄僵？ 我用进化生物学的
Model of Punctuated Equilibrium 来回答这个问题。这 PE Model 由两部分做成：正反馈
和负反馈。这反馈是一个换得快的过程。这个过程要经过注意力转移和模仿。 负反馈
是一个自动教程的机制。 这个机制均衡任何外力来创造一个稳定的输出。按照这个模
型，如果中国和台湾增加他们的破坏性等，美国就会增加他的影响力和提高稳定性，
导致减少他们冲突。 为了测试我的假设我实现了一个理论制造的个案研究。 我的第一
个案例包含了台湾第一和第二次台海危机。 我的第二个案例讨论了第三次台海危机和
1999年台湾海峡对峙。我的研究目的是来了解台海的冲突和重建台湾和中国的关系。 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 There have been long-standing tensions between the People’s Republic of China and 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Taiwan Strait serves as the symbolic epicenter of 
this tumultuous relationship. Discord was heightened across the Taiwan Strait when the 
President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui decided to visit Cornell University for a class reunion in 
June of 1995. The U.S. government under Bill Clinton initially refused this request, but the 
U.S. Congress passed a resolution to allow President Lee to visit the United States. In 
response, the People’s Republic of China conducted a series of threatening military exercises 
from August 1995 into March 1996. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also carried out a 
set of missile tests less than fifty miles from Taiwan’s major port cities of Keelung and 
Kaohsiung.1 The United States countered this challenge with the largest display of U.S. 
military force in Asia since the Vietnam War. The situation was resolved only when U.S. 
President Clinton formally declared the “three nos” policy: no to Taiwan independence, no to 
two Chinas, and no to Taiwan joining international organizations that require statehood for 
membership. The fact that a simple visit to the United States appeared to challenge the PRC’s 
sovereignty to such a degree that another war in the Pacific looked likely suggests the dire 
straits of the Taiwan Strait relationship.  
 Despite this crisis—in addition to two previous Taiwan Strait Crises (in 1954-55 and 
1958) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation—relations between the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) remain in a deadlock. China has not been 
able to conquer Taiwan, and Taiwan still cannot secede from China. These cycles of tension 
across the Strait have repeatedly threatened to bring the United States into a war against 
                                                
1 Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 
Political Science Quarterly 115 no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 237.  
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China. In light of these crises, will this status quo of deadlock continue? Is Greater Chinese 
unification a myth or reality? I argue that this rivalry is likely to endure due to the negative 
feedback cycle instituted by the United States. This study analyzes the changing relations 
between China, Taiwan, and the United States using the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE 
Model) from international relations theory.2 It builds directly on the work of political scientist 
Weixing Hu, who examined the cross-Strait relationship using a version of this model. Key 
questions that will guide this study include:  Why does the deadlock that has defined China-
Taiwan relations for decades persist despite periods of extreme tension and change?  How 
have the foreign policy decisions of each state in the system helped to disrupt or maintain the 
persistent deadlock? To answer these questions, I will use the PE Model to explore the 
positive feedback cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and Taiwan Confrontation and the 
process by which the negative feedback cycle is reinstituted. A positive feedback mechanism, 
or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of 
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting 
mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to 
create a stable output. 
 I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the 
United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of 
conflict in accord with the PE theory. The independent variable of study is the level of 
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. The intervening variable is defined 
as the level of negative feedback from the United States. The resultant level of conflict is the 
                                                
2 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” in Policy Dynamics, 
ed. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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dependent variable. The operationalization and conceptualization of these variables is 
discussed in Chapter Three: Methodology.  
 To test my hypothesis, I use a theory-guided case study approach to analyze the 
complex and changing relationships among the actors (China, Taiwan, and the United 
States), and how domestic and foreign policy shifts in each political entity impact the status 
quo. Specifically, the case studies will examine the policy actions of the United States, 
China, and Taiwan leading up to, during, and in the aftermath of the three Taiwan Strait 
Crises and Taiwan Confrontation. I conduct two case studies: the first encompasses the First 
and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, and the second examines the Third Crisis and the Taiwan 
Confrontation. This study draws on secondary source material of historians and political 
scientists in English and Chinese. In addition, I consult primary sources from the National 
Security Archive and the Mainland Affairs Council Database. The goal of this study is to 
explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of negative feedback 
that deescalates the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter surveys the history of China-Taiwan relations, as well as the scholarship 
regarding the question of Greater Chinese unification: whether integration of the two polities 
is likely or if the status quo of deadlock is expected to continue. Next, it reviews literature 
regarding the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model), beginning with the model’s origins 
in evolutionary biology, its crossover into social science, and finally its application in the 
fields of political science and international relations. The chapter ends with a review of 
scholarly applications of the PE Model, in which I evaluate ideas in relation to my own 
study.  
 The PE Model has been applied in multiple ways within the fields of political science 
and international relations (IR). To describe common foundations of this approach, this 
chapter surveys different analytical perspectives. For example, I review Michael C. 
MacLeod’s “The Logic of Positive Feedback: Telecommunications Policy Through the 
Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of a Regulated Monopoly.” While not directly 
related to international relations, MacLeod’s methodology will inform my own study. 
Second, I review Weixing Hu’s “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: 
A Punctuated Equilibrium Model.” I plan to build on these studies to more strictly apply the 
PE Model to specific instances of positive feedback.  
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 The Taiwan Strait, also called the Formosa Strait, is an arm of the Pacific Ocean, 100 
miles (160 km) wide at its narrowest point, lying between the coast of China’s Fukien 
province and the island of Taiwan (Formosa). The term ‘cross-Strait relations’ refers to the 
 10 
intersecting political, military, economic, cultural, and social relationships between Taiwan 
and Mainland China. Given the politically charged nature of the relationship between Taiwan 
and China, this phrase is often used to avoid naming either side directly and reproducing a 
discourse of Taiwan as either differentiated from or as a part of China. ‘Cross-Strait 
relations’ as a phrase acknowledges only the most irrefutable, empirical facts of geography 
and the presence of a stretch of ocean between the two coasts. In order to comprehend the 
complexities of the cross-Strait relationship, it is important to understand several key actors 
involved and their motivations.  
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Taiwan Strait3 
 
  
 The People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in 1949 and led by the Chinese 
Communist Party, claims Taiwan as part of the territory of China. It refers to Taiwan as a 
                                                
3 “Taiwan Simulates 2017 Invasion by China,” Islam Times, 16 July 2013, 
http://islamtimes.org/en/doc/news/283554/ (accessed November 11, 2015). 
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rogue province.4 The PRC’s responses to Taiwan’s socio-political development range from 
emotional appeals to ‘Taiwan compatriots’5 to belligerent threats and displays of military 
power. The PRC has clearly stated its goal of the eventual integration of the two entities. 
Steven Goldstein explains, “The present policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
primarily to seek peaceful means to achieve a united China through reunification with 
Taiwan under the rubric of ‘one country, two systems.’”6 Beijing will only negotiate on the 
precondition that Taiwan recognizes the “one China” principle. 
 The Republic of China (ROC) was founded on Mainland China in 1912 at the end of 
the Qing dynasty.7 At the time, the island of Taiwan, which had been ceded in perpetuity by 
the Qing in 1895, was a colony of Japan. Following the Japanese surrender in World War II 
in 1945, the ROC, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang, took control of the island. In 
1947, following eighteen months of corrupt KMT governance, the native Taiwanese rebelled. 
The bitter legacy of the brutal suppression of the February Twenty-eighth Uprising led to the 
emergence of the modern Taiwanese independence movement.8 In 1949, the Nationalists 
(KMT) lost the Civil War to the Communists and relocated the national government of the 
ROC to Taipei on Taiwan. A million or more Nationalist refugees and soldiers arrived to live 
among a hostile population of nearly five million Taiwanese. 
                                                
4 Yueran Zhang, “The Taiwan in My Mind,” Foreign Policy, 12 February 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/12/the-taiwan-in-my-mind/ (accessed November 11, 2015). 
5 “China Issues Statement on Taiwan Election,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: 
The Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the State Council, 17 November 2000, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15789.shtml (accessed November 11, 2015). 
6 Steven M. Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 15:1 (2002), p. 86.  
7 Asian Studies Center, “Asian Studies Presents Windows on Asia: China-History,” Michigan State University, 
2014, http://asia.isp.msu.edu/wbwoa/east_asia/china/history/Republican_China.htm (accessed November 11, 
2015). 
8 Chunjuan Nancy Wei, “Cross Strait Relations Today: Challenges and Opportunities,” in New Dynamics in 
East Asian Politics, ed. Zhiqun Zhu (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2012), pp. 
85-87. 
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 This history continues to influence Taiwan’s divisive and often rancorous democratic 
politics. National identity is the subject of vigorous debate. Two opposing political coalitions 
define Taiwan’s domestic and foreign policy. Political opinion is polarized between the Pan-
Blue Coalition of parties who support unification and a broader Chinese cultural identity, and 
the Pan-Green Coalition comprised of those supporting independence, self-determination, 
and Taiwanese cultural nationalism. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the largest 
Pan-Green party, espouses the “one country on each side” ideology concerning cross-Strait 
relations, but in practice supports the status quo so as not to provoke the PRC.9 The KMT, the 
largest Pan-Blue party, advocates a “one area” diplomatic truce. They seek to maintain the 
status quo with the stated goal of unification.10 The resultant foreign policy of the ROC “has 
been to maintain a status quo that perpetuates its declared status as a ‘sovereign independent’ 
state, while remaining open to a future relationship with the Mainland that might be achieved 
through negotiations.”11 Taipei has stated it will only conduct negotiations if not forced to 
address the “one China” issue.  
 Meanwhile, the United States is another player in the complex affairs of China and 
Taiwan. The United States seeks to promote stability in the region, because if a conflict were 
to break out, there is a high probability of American involvement.12 The United States 
encourages dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, but avoids a direct mediating role. Due to the 
relations of the United States with both the ROC and the PRC, it must conduct the balancing 
act in the region.  
                                                
9 Wei, “Cross Strait Relations Today,” pp. 85-87. 
10 Ibid., p. 86. 
11 Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait,” p. 86. 
12 Ibid., p. 87.  
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 Taiwan and the United States have a long history. The two countries were close allies 
during World War II and after the ROC relocated to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 
1949, the United States continued to recognize the ROC as the sole government of China. 
During the Cold War era and in the aftermath of the Korean War, the United States, as part of 
their anti-communist foreign policy, signed the Sino-American Defense Treaty in 1954 to 
consolidate their military alliance with the ROC. U.S. policy towards the ROC experienced 
major change in 1972, when President Nixon began to normalize U.S. relations with the 
PRC. On January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from the ROC 
to the PRC. This action, however, did not end the long-standing relationship between the 
United States and the ROC. On April 10, 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) into law, which to this day remains the cornerstone of the relationship 
between the ROC and the United States. This document clearly states that U.S. political, 
security, and economic interests are linked to peace and stability in the Western Pacific.13 
 Since 1949, the United States and the PRC have also had a complex relationship, 
evolving from tense standoffs to a complex mix of intensifying diplomacy, growing 
international rivalry, and increasingly intertwined economies. In the Chinese Civil War, the 
United States backed the Nationalist government of Chiang. This set the stage for several 
decades of limited U.S. relations with Mainland China.14 In the spring of 1955, in the midst 
of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States threatened a nuclear attack on China. In 
April, China agreed to negotiate. However, crisis erupted again in 1956, 1996, and 1999.  
 The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 turned the tide of U.S.-China relations. The 
Soviet Union replaced the United States as China’s biggest threat, contributing to the PRC’s 
                                                
13 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present),” http://www.cfr.org/china/us-
relations-china-1949---present/p17698 (accessed November 12, 2015). 
14 Ibid. 
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eventual rapprochement with the United States. 1971 began the era of Ping-Pong Diplomacy, 
in which China’s ping-pong team invited members of the U.S. team to China. That same 
year, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to China.15 Shortly thereafter, the 
United States and the UN recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China, 
endowing it with the permanent Security Council seat formerly held by the ROC. In 1972 
President Nixon visited China and met with Chairman Mao Zedong. They signed the 
Shanghai Communiqué, which set the stage for improved relations by allowing China and the 
United States to discuss difficult issues like Taiwan.16  In the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre, the United States suspended military sales to China and froze relations. In 1993, 
President Clinton launched a policy of “constructive engagement” with China. President 
Clinton signed the U.S-China Relations Act of 2000, granting the PRC permanent normal 
trade relations with the United States.17  Tensions and economic interdependence have only 
deepened between the United States and the PRC. The hot-cold relationship between the two 
states can be attributed to their vastly different value systems and governmental structures. 
However, they are so interdependent that their deepening relations are unavoidable.  
 The Soviet Union and later Russia provide context for the conflicts across the Taiwan 
Strait. However, due to the subsidiary role it plays in the three Taiwan Strait crises and 
Taiwan confrontation, this actor falls outside the bounds of my study. 
 China, Taiwan, and the United States each play a part in the balancing act that is 
cross-Strait relations, but those roles have changed over time. China has since grown into a 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 “Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai 
Communique),” China Through a Lens, 28 February 1972, http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-
us/26012.htm (accessed November 12, 2015). 
17 Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).” 
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regional and global hegemon, Taiwan into a budding democracy, and the United States 
serves as their unwilling mediator.  
 
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS:  
PREDICTING UNIFICATION OR DEADLOCK  
 
 Within the literature about China-Taiwan relations, many political science scholars 
examine the question of Chinese unification as a potential solution to tensions across the 
Strait. The unification camp believes that through economic, cultural, and political 
integration Taiwan will be pulled into the orbit of the PRC. Conversely, the status quo camp 
argues that the prediction of unification is overly optimistic. Scholars argue that the 
differences between the two political entities are simply too great to ever overcome the 
separation.  
 
UNIFICATION 
 Scholars define unification as the eventuality that the two political entities of the PRC 
on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan will merge into a single political entity. This camp 
is comprised of researchers who believe that China and Taiwan will overcome the “persistent 
deadlock” to unite by means of economic, cultural, and/or political integration.  
 Several scholars argue that Greater China will be unified through economic 
integration despite the vastly different economic systems and political structures on the 
Mainland and on Taiwan. These scholars model economic integration after the experience of 
the European Union (EU), claiming that “economic integration can ramify and generate 
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spillover effects,”18 into political and cultural areas. These positive spillovers foster an 
increasingly integrated community. Estrada and Park found evidence that the gap in 
economic and technological development between the two polities is shrinking.19 Robert F. 
Ash and Y. Y. Kueh argue, “The undoubted benefits of closer economic integration within 
Greater China are not to be taken for granted…. But many obstacles remain to be overcome 
if the growth and structural benefits are to be sustained.”20 Economic integration of these two 
polities could be considered a positive feedback cycle, but only if economic ties truly spilled 
over into the political arena.  
 Some scholars contend that unification will occur via cultural integration, that the 
commonalities among citizens on the ground will overcome the political impasse across the 
Strait. This is the belief that the shared culture of the citizens of China and Taiwan at the 
individual level will eventually overcome the overarching forces of ideology and power 
alignment. Culture such as religion can be a uniting force across territorial boundaries. 
Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng explain, “From the Taiwan side, accommodation of 
increasing religious exchanges is instrumental to peace with China, and perhaps to inducing 
China’s political liberalization. In Beijing, officials use cross-Strait religious ties as a non-
threatening means to draw Taiwan closer to unification.”21 The PRC utilizes pre-existing 
commonalities to bring the two political entities into dialogue. This multi-level integration of 
religious culture across the Strait combines political science and religious studies scholarship. 
One such scholar, Mayfair Mei-hui Yang examines the “complex interactions among the 
                                                
18 Chien-Min Chao, “Will Economic Integration Between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to Congenial 
Political Culture?” Asian Survey 43:2 (2003), p. 281.  
19 Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada and Donghyun Park, “China’s Unification: Myth or Reality?” Panoeconomics 4 
(2014), p. 465. 
20 Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh, “Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows 
between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 136 (December 1993), p. 745. 
21 Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng, “Religious Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Patterns, Alignments, 
and Political Effects,” Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Winter 2012), p. 60.  
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nation-state, popular religion, media capitalism, and gendered territorialization as these are 
inflected across the Taiwan Strait.”22 She points to one specific case of cultural integration 
and exchange in passing: “In 2000, [a] pilgrimage by Taiwanese worshippers of the maritime 
goddess Mazu to her natal home in Fujian Province was broadcast live from China back to 
Taiwan via satellite television.”23 This pilgrimage transcended territorial boundaries and the 
high-tension politics of cross-Strait relations. Both the PRC and ROC frame this grassroots 
religious movement as a common foundation on which other issues can be resolved and 
consensus built.  
  A small group of scholars argue unification will occur through political means 
despite the different political structures that pose a barrier to such an occurrence. Chao 
explains,  “As Mainland China grows in power, nations and sub-national regions in the 
continental vicinity will be sucked [sic] into its orbit and become satellites.”24 Examples, and 
perhaps prototypes, of this occurrence are Hong Kong and Macau. These two territories “are 
special administrative regions enjoying differing degrees of autonomy and rights.”25 Perhaps 
like these two political entities, Taiwan will also be pulled into China’s orbit under the “One 
Country, Two Systems” policy.  
 
DEADLOCK 
 However, another camp of literature refutes the prediction that unification will 
happen at all and predicts “persistent deadlock” in cross-Strait relations. These scholars 
                                                
22 Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, “Goddess across the Taiwan Strait: Matrifocal Ritual Space, Nation-State, and 
Satellite Television Footprints,” Public Culture 16:2 (Spring 2004), p. 209. 
23 Ibid., p. 210. 
24 Chao, “Economic Integration,” p. 281.  
25 Jeanette Ka-yee Yuen, “The Myth of Greater China? Hong Kong as a Prototype of Taiwan for Unification,” 
Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 5 (July 2014), p. 134. 
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define the status quo of cross-Strait relations as the situation in which China cannot conquer 
Taiwan and Taiwan cannot secede from China. Steven Goldstein defines the various forms 
such a situation might take: When parties agree on the rules of the game, the status quo can 
be peaceful. This is the condition that characterizes some of the periods of détente in cross-
Strait relations. A status quo can be tense and “deadlocked when the parties must accept 
unsatisfying compromises because individually preferred outcomes are not possible.”26 The 
events precipitating the three Taiwan Strait Crises can be described in this way. A final 
condition of open conflict may occur if parties pursue goals in opposition to the interests of 
others. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater in the United States is one instance 
of conflicting interests escalating to open conflict across the Strait. Scholars have attributed 
the nature of the deadlock across the Strait to various different conditions: different political 
structures, international pressures, and contending identities. 
 One set of scholars within this literature argues that cross-Strait relations have 
reached an impasse due to the vastly different political structures on Mainland China and 
Taiwan. After analyzing the prospects for unification via economic and political integration, 
Chien-Min Chao concludes that the political differences between the polities are nearly 
insurmountable and unification is unlikely.27 This political difference is also theoretical and 
ideological. George T. Crane argues that early on in their relationship the PRC and the ROC 
both claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China: “Contested sovereignty 
stands in the way of negotiation and political compromise, both prerequisites for deeper 
                                                
26 Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait,” p. 85. 
27 Chao, “Economic Integration,” p. 304. 
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integration.” 28  The issue of differing political systems, one democratic and the other 
authoritarian, is a major obstacle to Chinese unification.  
 International pressures also reinforce the status quo of deadlock between China and 
Taiwan. The United States is a key participant in cross-Strait relations. While officially 
recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of Greater China since 1972, the United 
States continues to make arms deals with Taiwan. The United States has clearly stated that it 
supports only a peaceful settlement of the dispute.29 Wang and Liu explain, “The U.S. has 
promoted a policy of “double renunciation” in the region, meaning “Taipei would renounce 
its intention of seeking Taiwan’s de jure independence, in exchange for Beijing’s consent not 
to use force against the island country.”30 Foreign influence in the region on the part of the 
United States is an important piece of the framework that keeps the deadlock in place.  
 Other scholars explain the status quo as the result of contending identities both within 
Taiwan and between the ROC and the PRC. The democratization process that began in 
Taiwan in 1987 has allowed Taiwanese national identity to flourish and define itself as 
separate from the Mainland identity.31 Wang and Liu state: “National identity can be defined 
as an individual’s psychological attachment to a political community united by 
characteristics that differentiate that community from others.”32 For example, each citizen of 
Taiwan is socialized in a democratic system of government, while each citizen of the PRC is 
socialized under the new capitalist communism. The co-authors explain that the majority of 
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people living on the island of Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo. The political and 
social culture of the Mainland and that of Taiwan are vastly different and the gap is only 
widening. According to June Teufel Dreyer, “A sense of identity apart from that of Mainland 
China has existed on Taiwan for more than a century.”33 Taiwan has been defined by the 
cultures of its aboriginal tribes, numerous occurrences of European imperialism, and post-
WWII American occupation. The cultural divide has deepened even further under the rule 
Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. Communism fundamentally changed the culture of 
China, while Taiwan’s isolation from the Mainland starting in 1949 fostered a vast 
divergence of political identity and culture.34 All of these are contributing factors to the 
perpetuation of the status quo of stalemate. Until China democratizes, the prospects look 
bleak for unification. 
 Even now this debate rages on. In February of 2014 China and Taiwan held their first 
official talks since the end of China’s civil war in 1949.35 More recently on November 7, 
2015, the leaders of China and Taiwan held historic talks in Singapore. According to BBC 
News, “Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou shook hands at 
the start of the talks, which were seen as largely symbolic.”36 The two leaders did not discuss 
any major agreements, or the South China Sea disputes. However, they did discuss the 
establishment of a cross-Strait hotline, consolidating the “1992 consensus” agreement.37 Even 
as President Ma Ying-jeou pushes for closer ties with China as part of his KMT party 
agenda, the backlash from the Taiwanese people is increasing. In light of these 
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developments, unificationists are hopeful, while scholars who predict continued deadlock are 
skeptical.  
 
THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRUM MODEL 
 This section discusses the creation of the PE Model, its crossover into social science, 
and finally its application in political science and international relations literature. Beginning 
with an explanation of Niles Eldredges’ Allopatric Model as the forerunner of the PE Model, 
I go on to describe the collaborative and formative work of “Punctuated Equilibrium: An 
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,” co-authored by Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Next, 
I survey social science literature in the fields of anthropology, the evolution of human social 
behavior, and psychobiology. Finally, I examine instances of the PE Model in the fields of 
public policy and political science.  
 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 
 The Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model) was originally the brainchild of Niles 
Eldredge in his study, “The Allopatric Model and Phylogeny in Paleozoic Invertebrates.” He 
describes the appearances and lifetimes of three subspecies of Phacops rana trilobites that 
characterize the geological stages of the middle Devonian. Each subspecies had a certain 
number of dorsoventral columns of eye lenses, 18, 17 and 16-15, respectively. The number of 
eye lenses decreased successively in very quick bursts through Cazenovia, Tioughnioga and 
Taghanic stages of rock strata. Eldredge concludes: 
“The majority of species preserved in epeiric sediments show no change in 
species-specific characters throughout the interval of their stratigraphic 
occurrence, and the phyletic model is inapplicable to most of these elements 
 22 
of the fossil record. Instead, change in, or development of, species-specific 
characters is envisioned as occurring relatively rapidly in peripheral 
isolates.”38 
 
This means that changes in the trilobite population happened quickly and were separated by 
long periods of stasis. This observation inspired further development of the PE Model.  
 Eldredge went on to write an article with Stephen Jay Gould entitled “Punctuated 
Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism.” Here the co-authors propose that 
evolution is not a process of slow transformation, but a process “of homeostatic equilibria, 
disturbed only ‘rarely’ (i.e., rather often in the fullness of time) by rapid and episodic events 
of speciation.”39 They build on the previous work of the Allopatric Model as developed by 
Eldredge, and survey the other arguments in the field. They argue, and urge other scholars to 
consider, that evolution occurs in relatively short periods of rare and fast change followed by 
long periods of stasis, or equilibrium.  
 Punctuated equilibrium developed in response to gradualism. Gersick explains, 
“Gradualist paradigms imply that systems can ‘accept’ virtually any change, any time, as 
long as it is small enough; big changes result from the insensible accumulation of small 
ones.”40 In contrast, punctuated equilibrium suggests that for the history of most systems, 
there are underlying structures that actively prevent change, rather than the gradualist 
explanation where the potential for change always exists, but is suppressed because there 
would be no adaptive advantage to changing.  
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 Eldredge and Gould offer an alternate description of evolution that is supported by 
the fossil record. Their research question is why does the fossil record seem not to support 
the theory of gradualism?  Their answer is that species remain in stasis due to environmental 
and internal constraints until the need for change overwhelms the negative feedback 
mechanisms.  
 
THE STRUGGLE TOWARD SOCIAL SCIENCE  
 This section reviews literature of the PE Model that attempts to bridge the conceptual 
divide between evolutionary biology and social science. First, I examine the work of Albert 
Somit and Steven Peterson, The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 
a collection of social science scholarship that evaluates the efficacy of the model. Second, I 
present the results of three scholars from different social science fields. Then, I present the 
conclusions of Connie Gersick who, in her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A 
Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” synthesizes common 
definitions of the structural elements of the PE Model across a number of disciplines.  
 In their anthology The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 
Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson map the evolution of the model from its origins in 
evolutionary biology to the social sciences. Somit and Peterson state the two suppositions 
that natural scientists can agree upon: “First, that species undergo long periods of little or no 
evolutionary change,” and “Second, that these lengthy intervals of stasis (i.e., equilibrium) 
are broken (i.e., punctuated) by relatively rapid speciation events.”41 Translated into social 
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science these processes mirror negative and positive feedback cycles. Somit and Peterson 
struggle to use the PE Model in the fields of social science because they have not entirely 
shifted their methodological approach from the evolutionary biology literature.  
 Within the anthology, Susan Cachel, Allan Mazur, and Brian Gladue all try to answer 
the question: “Is human behavior the result of punctuational evolutionary processes?”42 This 
question is a step towards the model as defined in political science, but is still solidly rooted 
in the discipline of biology. All three conclude for different reasons that the PE Model has 
very modest explanatory power for the evolution of human behavior. Cachel in her article, 
“The Theory of Punctuated Equilibria and Evolutionary Anthropology,” concludes that the 
inherent difficulties of the model as it applies to the biological evolution of human beings 
make it unlikely that it will have much impact in anthropology.43 Mazur argues that while 
scientists have ample evidence of human physical evolution, they have very little information 
about the evolution of early human social behavior; therefore, the PE Model cannot be 
applied due to lack of sufficient data.44 Gladue believes that the timespan of human evolution 
is so short that “punctuationism” is not applicable to ongoing behavior in the field of 
psychobiology.45 The evolution of human behavior is difficult to examine due to the lack of 
evidence in the fossil record and the relatively short span of time Homo sapiens have existed.  
 While these social scientists do not find the PE model very useful to explain the 
evolution of human behavior, Albert and Somit try to use E.F. Miller’s concept of metaphor 
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to explain the leap of the model into social science. E. F. Miller defines metaphor as, “All 
types of transference of words and meaning from one kind of thing to another.”46 This 
definition is worded in the broadest sense. Metaphor is key to the development of theory in 
social science. “Once we see the world from the point of view of a particular metaphor,” 
Miller writes, “the face of it is changed. Adopting a new metaphor changes our attitude 
toward the facts.”47 Regarding politics specifically, “Metaphor is necessary to political 
knowledge precisely because the meaning of reality of the political world transcends what is 
given to observation…. Metaphors can take us beyond the observable and also make 
manifest the intelligible structure of the unobservable.”48 The problem of using punctuated 
equilibrium as a metaphor is that it loses explanatory power as a predictive model and theory. 
This is the wrong bridge to use to cross the model into social science. The history and 
evidence of human evolution is not sufficient to draw conclusions using the PE Model, but 
when converted into a theory used to examine the evolution of man-made institutions, its 
causal mechanisms are left intact, can be translated, and retain their explanatory power.  
 Another scholar who looks at the transfer of the PE Model into social science is 
Connie Gersick. In her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of 
the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” she compares conceptions of the PE Model from six 
domains: adult, group, and organizational development, history of science, biological 
evolution, and physical science to draw out a general definition. Across these disciplines, 
punctuated equilibrium involves “an alternation between long periods when stable 
infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of revolutionary 
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upheaval.”49 Gersick describes this theory of evolutionary change as being made up of three 
parts: deep structure, periods of equilibrium, and revolutionary periods.  
 Deep structure is the highly durable underlying order that explains the 
interrelationship between periods of equilibrium and periods of change. Gersick writes, “This 
deep structure is what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what 
disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary 
punctuations.”50 Deep structure in the fields she has combined can be defined as the 
environment. Since there is no equivalent to such a structure in the evolution of man-made 
policy, I will not include this concept in my study. 
 Equilibrium periods are characterized by negative feedback loops that actively seek to 
maintain the deep structure. Gersick says that when systems make adjustments to preserve 
the deep structure, they do so in opposition to internal and external perturbations, and “move 
incrementally along paths built into the deep structure.”51 The pursuit of stability in the deep 
structure can result in turbulent behavior.  
 Revolutions are relatively short periods when a deep structure breaks apart. This 
period of time is only resolved when a new deep structure forms out of the choices of the 
system. Gersick explains, “Revolutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems’ 
historical resources with current events, are not predicable; they may or may not leave a 
system better off. Revolutions vary in magnitude.”52 The deep structure forms the underlying 
negative feedback loop that pulls any deviations back into line. Therefore, this structure must 
be disassembled for any fundamental changes to take place.  
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 Transition periods, are made up of two processes: (1) dismantling the old deep 
structure and (2) constructing a new one. There are two basic sources of disruption to the 
deep structure. First, internal changes that “pull parts and actions out of alignment with each 
other or the environment.”53 This may be the effort of an actor in the system to change its 
relationship with another actor. Second, environmental changes can threaten the ability of the 
system to access and obtain resources. Gersick notes, “Human systems tend to outgrow the 
deep structures that govern their perspectives and activities.”54 The environment in which the 
system exists is no longer sufficient to sustain that system. Transition periods in political 
science are the moments where the positive feedback cycle overtakes the negative feedback 
structure.  
 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 Political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones converted the ideas presented 
in the PE Model from evolutionary biology into a theory of political science. Their 2002 
anthology is comprised of works that use the PE Model to explain U.S. domestic policy and 
social change. The same arguments and logic that they use to explain domestic policy can be 
extended to describe international phenomena.  
 A complete view of the institutions of the domestic and international systems must 
include attention to both positive and negative feedback processes. In their chapter, “Positive 
and Negative Feedback in Politics,” Baumgartner and Jones explain, in the context of U.S. 
domestic policy, how the PE Model operates in the field of political science. They state, “At 
times, government policies seem remarkably resistant to change, following standard 
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procedures, working within norms of consensus among all those involved, attracting little 
public attention, and deviating little from year to year.”55 The system described here is a 
negative feedback mechanism in which actors in a system counter each other to create a 
homeostatic device. In contrast to a negative feedback mechanism Baumgartner and Jones 
explain, “At other times, or in other areas of public policy, dramatic changes occur: new 
problems appear on the political agenda; crises require quick government response; new 
programs are created and old ones are terminated.”56 These are all examples of positive 
feedback mechanisms whereby rapid, punctuated change occurs. The PE Model combines 
the efforts of the many scholars studying different parts of the same process. Institutions are 
endogenous to the model, rather than exogenous. The policy process itself alters the way 
institutions function. This theory aims to produce a reliable model for longitudinal studies 
and is comprised of two parts: an understanding of institutionally induced equilibrium 
(negative feedback) and a theory of institutional development (positive feedback).  
 
APPLICATION OF THE PE MODEL 
 Some scholars use phenomena in the domestic or international systems to build upon 
the PE Model. Others use the model to explain a particular policy or subsystem, which either 
results in a rapid change due to a positive feedback mechanism, or results in a political 
balancing act. These scholars use the PE Model as a framework in which they integrate 
additional theoretical models that are more closely related to the subject of study. 
 Michael C. MacLeod’s article, “The Logic of Positive Feedback: 
Telecommunications Policy Through the Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of a 
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Regulated Monopoly,” is an example of the PE Model applied to policy change. MacLeod 
argues that scholars should be more concerned with positive feedback mechanisms because, 
“most policy subsystems have undergone rapid changes at some point in their evolution.”57  
He explains that positive feedback takes many forms in social science literature: 
“bandwagons, fads, tipping points, vicious and virtuous cycles, conflict expansion, and 
punctuated equilibrium.”58 Most studies of these forms of positive feedback focus mainly on 
mass behavior. MacLeod develops a two-part theory that examines both mass and elite 
behavior within the framework of the PE Model.  
 The author uses the lens of positive feedback to analyze political campaigns and 
collective action movements as well as policymaking. Regarding political campaigns, 
MacLeod states three important findings of voting behavior to the study of positive feedback: 
“(1) political campaigns have the strongest impact on those who are undecided; (2) in a 
situation of low information about one or more candidates, individuals gather information 
from others like them (and this is a rational strategy); (3) feelings of political efficacy are 
based on expectations of future success.”59 These behavioral patterns create information 
cascades. Similarly, collective actions usually involve some type of threshold or tipping point 
in addition to information cascades. MacLeod clarifies that a threshold is, “the point at which 
a given actor will make a decision based on the proportion of other actors that have already 
done so.”60 The main points he gathers from the work of other scholars is that bandwagons 
occur under two specific and equally necessary conditions: (1) there exists a large group with 
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little or no private information about the choices so they have no strong preferences towards 
one choice or the other; and (2) there is some expectation of success for the outcome of a 
choice.  
 These two conditions also apply to positive feedback in policy making with the 
addendum that elite decision makers are constrained by norms, rules, and procedures. These 
constraints form a negative feedback cycle of stability. MacLeod argues that these 
institutions promote short-term equilibriums amid punctuations, involving “the incorporation 
of new participants, issue redefinition, a loss of jurisdictional control, and changes in 
institutional structures and procedures.”61 For these forms of disruption to develop into 
positive feedback cycles in elite decision-making, two conditions must be met: (1) that there 
exist a significant number of actors who oppose or are indifferent to the status quo; and (2) 
that there is an expectation of success that the status quo could be changed. Due to the 
institutional pressures to maintain the status quo, elite decision makers must cross a much 
higher threshold than in mass behavior.  
 MacLeod has three hypotheses based on this function of preferences:62 
Probability (decision to challenge status quo) = (actor preference)* 
(perception of chances of success) + e 
The following is a summation of his three hypotheses: (1) If a significant percentage of 
actors come to oppose the status quo, then a positive feedback cycle is more likely to occur; 
(2) If expectations of successful challenges to the status quo increase, then a positive 
feedback cycle is more likely to occur; and (3) If an institutional challenge to the status quo 
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remains unchecked by other related political institutions, then cascades may lead to positive 
feedback and the destabilization of a policy area.63   
 In choosing his data, MacLeod first defines the four historical periods of 
telecommunications policy: “(1) competition from 1900 to 1933; (2) a powerful monopoly 
from 1934 to 1969; (3) limited competition from 1970 to AT&T breakup in 1984; and (4) full 
competition thereafter in long-distance service and telephone equipment manufacturing.”64 
Within this history, there are two periods of positive feedback, the first during the creation of 
the AT&T monopoly in the 1920s, and the second during the destruction of its monopoly in 
the 1980s. He operationalizes actor preferences by “coding outcomes of FCC and federal 
district court cases on telecommunications policy that involved allegations of antitrust 
violation by AT&T, and by coding the testimony of witnesses from various institutions and 
interest groups at congressional hearings.”65 He uses detailed qualitative case studies of 
telecommunications policy to double-check the validity of his findings. He operationalizes 
expectations of success by coding institutional attention to an issue. He performs a simple 
statistical analysis to create a table titled, “Percentage of Witness Statements at 
Congressional Hearings Either Supporting AT&T’s Monopoly or Neutral.”66 From this data 
MacLeod finds, “At times perceptions of success are just as important as preferences when 
accounting for policy outcomes,”67 a seemingly uncontroversial statement, but loaded with 
implications. His hypotheses are all supported by the data and are cross-referenced for 
validity with historical case study accounts. MacLeod targeted the instances of punctuation 
within the narrative of a negative feedback cycle to see how policies change overtime.   
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PE MODEL MEETS CROSS STRAIT RELATIONS 
 One author, Weixing Hu, comprehensively describes the forces that maintain the 
status quo in one cohesive framework using the PE Model. He examines relationships at the 
domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. He characterizes the cross-Strait deadlock as 
“economic integration cum political impasse.”68 His article examines three causal factors of 
the positive and negative feedback cycles that characterize the cross-Strait relationship: issue 
cycles, pro-independence leadership in Taiwan, and structural constraints. His research 
questions include: “Why have cross-Strait relations cycled like this over the past 60 years? 
How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship?”69 Hu defines the 
components of the negative feedback cycle as growing economic ties between the two 
polities, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development and the 
recently peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and Washington’s interests and leverage 
over the PRC and the ROC.  
 Hu’s explanation of the PE Model begins with Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay 
Gould, two paleontologists who challenged the Darwinist theory of gradualism. They state 
that there is no evidence for gradualism in the fossil record and that evolutionary change 
occurs “in localized, rare, rapid events of branching speciation.”70 Similar to the biological 
theory, the PE Model in the social sciences is used for longitudinal studies. He explains that 
there are three relevant insights of the PE Model for this case: (1) to explain the cycles of 
policy change in Taiwanese domestic politics; (2) to examine the roles of “political 
                                                
68 Weixing Hu, “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model,” 
Journal of Contemporary China 21:78 (November 2012), p. 933. 
69 Ibid., p. 934. 
70 Ibid., pp. 935-936. 
 33 
entrepreneurs,” who can set a new agenda within a stabilizing balance of power structure; 
and (3) to discern the mechanism or moments of transition between the periods of stability 
and change.71  He couples the PE Model with the path dependence theory to better explain 
“the weight of precedents, institutional separation of power, partisan politics, and interest 
groups.”72   
 In his methodology, Hu defines a triangle of actors: China, Taiwan, and the Unites 
States. He explains their relationships as a set of three two-level games. Within the large 
triangular relationship, “there are two important bilateral games that mutually affect one 
another: (1) the cross-Strait interplay that is deeply rooted in domestic politics in Taiwan and 
in Mainland China; and (2) U.S.-China relations.”73 In addition to these two, two-level 
games, there is the relationship between the Taiwanese government and its citizens and 
interest groups. Hu defines six variables: three domestic political processes and three 
bilateral relationships. Using three case studies, Hu examines the cycles of tension and 
détente: the first, 1949-1979; second, 1979-1999, and finally 1999-present. He chose these 
time frames as each contains a “rise and fall of tension over some contentious issue, followed 
by a period of détente.”74 He concludes his article by indicating that he expects another 
punctuation to the current equilibrium over the issue of reunification.  
 Weixing Hu provides a comprehensive breakdown of the situation across the Strait; 
however, he could have used the PE Model more effectively. Breaking down the causes of 
this situation of deadlock between Taiwan and China into separate parts, while sometimes 
useful for conceptualization, could be misleading. His conception of the model is rather 
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shallow compared to other scholars. Hu focused on three entire periods of both change and 
stability using three common causal factors, but viewed the status quo as unchanging.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 The status quo of stable tension across the Taiwan Strait, rather than the possibility of 
unification, is the dominant prediction in the literature and can best describe the major 
developments of cross-Strait relations over time. Of the theories used to examine cross-Strait 
relations, the punctuated equilibrium model is the most compelling since it accounts for both 
incrementalist and non-incrementalist conceptions of policy change. Originally a descriptive 
model developed by Eldredge and Gould in the field of evolutionary biology, Baumgartner 
and Jones translate the theory into a causal model of political science. The causal 
mechanisms are positive and negative feedback cycles. Depending on topic of study, scholars 
must rely on other theories to explain the causal mechanism of these positive and negative 
feedback cycles.  
 My research question is: Why has the cross-Strait deadlock persisted for 65 years? 
The causal mechanism for stasis is a negative feedback cycle perpetuated by the United 
States to counter the actions of China and Taiwan. Essentially, the balance of power politics 
model functions as the negative feedback mechanism. The causal mechanisms for change are 
attention shift and mimicking, as described by Baumgartner and Jones. These positive 
feedback mechanisms between China and Taiwan cause tensions to escalate beyond what the 
negative feedback mechanism can handle.  
 From the three scholars I reviewed, MacLeod, Cioffi-Revilla, and Hu I will adopt key 
insights. I will implement MacLeod’s focus on positive feedback cycles by examining the 
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actions of elite decision makers in both China and Taiwan. My study will build directly on 
the work of Weixing Hu. Punctuated equilibrium is a model of evolutionary change. Hu only 
focuses on the negative feedback mechanisms created by growing economic ties between 
China and Taiwan, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development 
and the recent peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and U.S. interests and leverage over 
both polities. I want to build on the instances of positive feedback because the perpetuating 
mechanisms for the endurance of this rivalry can be best examined when stretched to their 
breaking point. I plan to examine domestic processes as they relate to cross-Strait relations 
not only on Taiwan, but also on the Mainland and in the United States. Hu confines his study 
by only examining relations between China and Taiwan, China and the United States, and the 
Taiwanese government and its constituents. The United States has an important relationship 
with Taiwan that merits analysis. Finally, he views the status quo as unchanging, yet the 
motivations for the deadlock have changed over time. The interests and identities of the 
United States, Taiwan, and China in respect to one another have also evolved. The PRC has 
become a relative superpower, Taiwan has recently democratized, and the United States has 
become a crucial trading partner with Mainland China. The status quo of political deadlock 
has not changed, but the nature of relations across the Strait has changed. Early in the history 
of the rivalry, following the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait was in open conflict. 
However, to fast-forward, increasing the economic dependence of Taiwan on China has 
changed the status quo into one of peaceful détente. Even as the Strait remains politically 
deadlocked, the identities and interests of these polities in relation to one another have 
changed. These changes are the result of positive feedback. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The goal of this study is to explore the presence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and 
the resultant level of negative feedback that may deescalate the situation until the political 
deadlock is reinstated. The research question guiding this study is, “Why has the cross-Strait 
deadlock persisted for 65 years?” To answer this question I employ the positive and negative 
feedback cycles of the Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) Model. As stated in the previous chapter, 
I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their mutually disruptive actions, then the 
United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of 
conflict. In this chapter, I describe the hypothesis I will use in my study, operationalize each 
of the three variables, discuss my method, and describe the process of selecting my cases. 
 
HYPOTHESIS OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM 
 The primary hypothesis of study for this project is: If the level of positive feedback 
generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative feedback from the 
United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict.  
 
Figure 3.1: Primary Hypothesis 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 As noted in figure 3.1, the independent variable for this hypothesis will be the level of 
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. I will measure this variable in the 
two years prior to each crisis (IV2-), during each crisis (IVD), and in the two years after the 
official end of each crisis (IV2+). These periods of time are shown in figure 3.2. I will 
compare each of these measures to determine how the positive feedback cycle grew and 
ended.   
 
Figure 3.2: Timeframes of the Independent Variable 
 
 
Taiwan 
 The levels of positive feedback generated by Taiwan can be categorized as diplomatic 
and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, I operationalize the level 
of this variable as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption.  
 Diplomatic disruption is categorized as low, medium, and high. For the purpose of 
this study I operationalize low diplomatic disruption as Taiwan’s political cooperation with 
China or an isolationist policy. Isolation entails little communication and, therefore, little 
chance of conflict breaking out due to a diplomatic issue. Cooperation amounts to 
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communication in order to foster greater interdependence. Both tactics promote stability 
across the Strait. Medium disruption of this type is defined as Taiwan pressuring the United 
States for a defense treaty or to publicly state its intent to defend Taiwan. This level of 
disruption also includes statements by ROC leaders that China must democratize as a 
condition of unification. High-level disruption is operationalized as Taiwan seeking 
recognition as a sovereign state from major powers in the international system, Taiwan’s 
public condemnation of Chinese actions, and/or threats of force against China. 
 The disruptive force of Taiwanese military actions is also broken down into low, 
medium, and high levels. Low-level military disruption is defined as the stockpiling of 
weapons and offensive/defensive systems. Medium-level military disruption is 
operationalized as Taiwan aiming missiles at China and amassing troops. High-level military 
disruption is characterized as Taiwan firing missiles at Mainland China and/or moving troops 
to strategic positions in order to mount an assault. 
 
China 
 The levels of positive feedback generated by China can be categorized as diplomatic 
and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, the level of this variable 
can be operationalized as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption. 
 First, I will measure China’s diplomatic disruption, which can be defined by levels 
low, medium, and high. Low disruption is operationalized as China’s diplomatic isolation 
from or cooperation with the United States and/or Taiwan. Isolation amounts to little 
communication and therefore little diplomatic conflict, while cooperation entails 
communication with the intent to establish stable relations. Both states result in increased 
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stability in the region. Medium disruption defined as China pressuring the United States to 
condemn Taiwanese actions, the detainment of U.S. soldiers, and insistence on the “one 
China” principle as a condition for negotiations. High levels of disruption can be observed 
when China threatens to use force against Taiwan, publicly condemns Taiwanese or U.S. 
actions, and blocks Taiwan’s entry to international organizations. 
 Finally, I will measure the disruptive force of China’s military aggression, which can 
also be defined at low, medium, and high levels. Low-level disruption is characterized as 
preparatory measures such as stockpiling weapons and installing offensive/defense systems 
as well as the declaration of a ceasefire. Medium aggression is operationalized as threatening 
through action to use force against Taiwan or the United States. For example, if China were 
to aim missiles at Taiwan or begin amassing troops, then tensions in the region would 
escalate. High levels of disruption occur when China actually fires missiles, mobilizes troops, 
seeks nuclear capability, or threatens to use weapons of mass destruction against Taiwan. 
 
INTERVENING VARIABLE 
 The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the level of negative feedback from the 
United States in response to the disruptive actions of China and Taiwan. I will measure this 
variable in the two years prior to each crisis (IntV2-), during the crisis (IntVD), and in the 
two years following (IntV2+). These time periods are detailed in figure 3.3 below. I will take 
measurements during each of these times to see how the forces of negative feedback are 
overwhelmed and then reinstated. The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the process 
of reestablishing the negative feedback cycle and the status quo. There are low, medium, and 
high levels of opposition. 
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Figure 3.3: Timeframes for the Intervening Variable 
 
 
U.S Response to Taiwan 
 To evaluate the level of U.S. military opposition to Taiwanese disruption I will use 
Patrick Regan’s six-point scale: (1) troops deployed against Taiwan/for the PRC, (2) naval 
forces against Taiwan/for the PRC, (3) equipment or aid to China, (4) intelligence or advisors 
to China, (5) air support to China, and (6) military sanctions against Taiwan.75 If two of the 
six can be observed, then there is a low level of opposition. When three of the six exist, there 
is a medium level of opposition. A high level of opposition occurs when four or more of the 
six points are observed.  
 U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwanese disruption can be categorized as low, 
medium, or high. Low diplomatic opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of 
Taiwan’s actions, the United States trying to persuade Taiwan to withdraw from the offshore 
islands, or American citizens advocating for U.S. recognition of the PRC. Medium 
opposition is operationalized as the United States publicly improving relations with Mainland 
                                                
75 Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Interventions and Intrastate Conflict, (University of 
Michigan Press, 2002). http://www3.nd.edu/~pregan3/replicationdata.html. 
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China. This level also includes U.S. reluctance to deepen diplomatic ties with Taiwan. High-
level diplomatic opposition of the United States can be observed in the creation of official 
treaties with China, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break 
out. 
 
U.S. Response to China 
 Military intervention is defined as U.S. actions that support the sovereignty of Taiwan 
through military means. To evaluate this variable I will use political scientist Patrick Regan’s 
six point nominal scale: (1) troops, (2) naval forces, (3) equipment or aid, (4) intelligence or 
advisors, (5) air support, and (6) military sanctions.76 If two of the six points are met, then the 
situation can be defined as low opposition. When three of the six are present, the opposition 
of the United States is at a medium level. If four or more of the six points are observed, then 
a high level of U.S. opposition exists. 
 U.S. diplomacy can also be broken down into low, medium, and high levels of 
opposition to the actions of China. Low opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of 
China’s actions, or support for Taiwan. Medium opposition is operationalized as the 
existence of U.S. informal agreements with Taiwan to protect its security, and therefore its 
sovereignty, such as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This level also includes U.S. threats to 
go to war with China in the defense of peace in the region and an unwillingness to negotiate 
with China. High-level diplomatic opposition of the United States is the creation of official 
treaties with Taiwan, with other states in the region, or of domestic resolutions in the United 
                                                
76 Ibid.  
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States, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break out in the 
Taiwan Strait. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the resultant level of conflict from two 
years after the official end date of each crisis until four years after that date. This variable, 
framed in terms of the PE Model, is the transformation of a positive feedback cycle back into 
a negative feedback cycle. To establish a baseline of the status quo, as it existed before and 
after each conflict, I will apply the same set of measures from four years prior to the official 
start date of each crisis until two years prior (DV2-) and to the timespan two years after until 
four years after (DV2+) the official cessation of each crisis.  Figure 3.4 illustrates these 
timespans Using military, diplomatic, and economic measures of conflict, as well as a 
measure of third-party involvement, I will establish what the status quo was in the two years 
framing the independent and intervening variable measures.  
 
Figure 3.4: Timespans for the Dependent Variable 
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 The level of military conflict in the region can be operationalized on a four-point 
scale of low to high: (1) military conflict is the reduction of defensive capabilities in the 
region, (2) the de-escalation of offensive forces or threats to use force, (3) cessation of 
military force (truce or ceasefire) or the mobilization of troops and deployment of weapons 
systems, and (4) continued armed conflict with casualties. The level of diplomatic conflict 
can be defined on a similar scale: (1) cooperation and formal negotiation, (2) Within existing 
channels of communication making negotiations difficult, (3) hostility to negotiation with 
each other, but open to negotiation with a third party and (4) cessation of communication. 
The level of third party involvement (TPI) can also be charted on a four-point scale: (1) 
nonintervention policy, implying that the situation is stable or contained enough to leave 
alone, (2) brokering peace between China and Taiwan or dissuading Taiwan from inciting 
further military conflict, and (3) soft support in the form of defending the position of the 
ROC in the UN and other international organizations and/or trade embargoes against the 
PRC. This level also includes ambiguous policy, which stipulates unclearly defined 
parameters for the defense of Taiwan. This level includes the deepening of relations with one 
or the other party through diplomatic or economic means. The final level of third party 
involvement is (4) hard support in a threat of foreign troops on the ground or warships and 
air support in the Taiwan Strait, and/or withholding/blocking military aid to PRC. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 In order to examine the complexity of cross-Strait relations, I employ a theory-guided 
case study and draw insightful conclusions by comparing the mechanisms of negative 
feedback and the resultant levels of conflict across cases. With two case studies I can better 
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understand the details of both the actors and the events to trace how the political deadlock 
between the PRC and the ROC has continued despite intense periods of positive feedback 
and change.  
 The question of why this deadlock across the Taiwan Strait has persisted for 65 years, 
lends itself to a case study approach. My goal is to discover the process of how a situation of 
virtual stasis has persisted in a complex and changing environment. There also exist 
relatively few instances of the positive feedback cycles of crisis I hope to examine because 
the situation between the PRC and ROC has only existed since the Chinese Civil War in 
1949.  
 Other methodological approaches would not have the same depth of explanatory 
power as a case study approach. Due to the nature of Taiwan’s lack of statehood, too little 
data exists in many of the areas I intend to study and measure. Often datasets do not include 
Taiwan since it is not a universally recognized sovereign state. While statistical studies are 
often reliable, they loose some validity in their inability to focus on detail and nuance. I will 
not be conducting a rigorous comparative case study that “vary[s] on the dependent 
variable,”77 due to the nature of cross-Strait relations. In these cases I expect the dependent 
variable to be held in equilibrium by the negative feedback mechanism of counterbalancing 
state actors.  
 My methodology combines a comparative case study and a theory guided case study. 
I will compare the mechanisms of negative feedback across these two cases to see if there are 
similarities or differences, but I am at the same time trying to explain the puzzle of this 
particular case as a whole. The theory-guided component of this study is that it does not try 
                                                
77 Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political 
Psychology,” Political Psychology 20:2 (1999), p. 380. 
 45 
to generalize beyond the data. Levy explains, “Theory-guided case studies…aim to explain 
and/or interpret a single historical episode rather that to generalize beyond the data.”78  This 
definition points more towards the goal of this study. This method of case study relies 
heavily on history and aims to explain it in a focused way. My goal is to explain why the 
status quo is maintained despite the changing identities and interests of the actors involved. 
This methodology is also known as an interpretive,79 disciplined configurative,80 or case-
explaining case study.81 Harry Eckstein in his article, “Case Study and Theory in Political 
Science,” establishes the importance of “crucial case studies in testing theory, undermining 
the accepted wisdom in comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better.82  
I am using the punctuated equilibrium model in much the same way. If my hypotheses are 
falsified, the PE Model may not be the most appropriate theory with which to analyze this set 
of cases. 
 
CASE SELECTION 
 I will examine two instances of positive feedback in the Taiwan Strait: the first 
encompasses the crises of 1954-55 and of 1958, and the second covers the 1995-96 crisis and 
the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. The variables 
and their measures defined above will provide a framework to analyze each case. In order to 
                                                
78 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 25:1 (2008), p. 4. 
79 A. Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65:3 
(1971), p. 691. 
80 H. Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Handbook of Political Science, eds. F. 
Greenstein and N Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), p. 99-104. 
81 S. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 74-75. 
82 “Harry H. Eckstein, Political Science: Irvine,” University of California, 
http://texts.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb267nb0r3&doc.view=frames&chunk.id=div00015&toc.id= (accessed 
December 7, 2015). 
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examine the causes of this status quo I will perform a focused comparative/theory-guided 
comparison of the three Taiwan Strait Crises. These crisis situations are instances of positive 
feedback that stretch the negative feedback mechanisms to their breaking point. Within these 
periods of extreme tension lie the answers to the question: Why has this deadlock continued 
to exist after 65 years? 
  For Case 1, I will combine the first two crises of 1954-55 and of 1958 because they 
are one instance of positive feedback. I will define the dates of crisis for the first case as the 
start date of the first crisis and the end date of the second. The First Crisis began on 
September 3, 1954 when the Communists on the Mainland began artillery bombardment of 
the Island of Quemoy. The official end of The Second Crisis was October 6, 1958 when the 
Chinese Minister of National Defense offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the 
nationalists and announced that the PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week. For 
my independent variable I will examine the level of positive feedback in the two years prior 
(IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the conflict (IV2+). I will measure the 
intervening variable during the same times. For the dependent variable I will examine the 
two years framing the independent and intervening variable measures. See figure 3.5 for a 
breakdown of the dates. 
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Figure 3.5: Case 1 Timeline 
 
   
 The second case study for this project focuses on the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 
1995-1996 and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. These incidents together form one positive 
feedback cycle. The third crisis began on June 9-10, 1995 when ROC President Lee Teng-hui 
visited his alma mater, Cornell University in the United States. The official end of the 
confrontation was May 29, 2000, when President Chen was elected and expressed a desire to 
return to the status quo. For my independent variable, I will examine the level of positive 
feedback in the two years prior (IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the 
conflict (IV2+). I will measure the intervening variable during the same times. For the 
dependent variable I will examine the two years framing the independent and intervening 
variable measures. See figure 3.6 for a breakdown of the dates. 
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Figure 3.6: Case 2 Timeline 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 Why has the deadlock across the Taiwan Strait persisted for 65 years? I argue that the 
model of punctuated equilibrium can offer an answer. I hypothesize that if the level of 
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative 
feedback from the United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. This 
chapter has discussed the operationalization of the independent, intervening, and dependent 
variables of study. In order to conduct a comparative/theory guided case study that examines 
positive and negative feedback cycles in cross-Strait relations, I selected crisis situations for 
my two cases. The next chapter will examine each case from the initial point of disruption, 
through the negative feedback mechanisms, until the status quo is reinstituted. In the next 
chapter I conduct my first case study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CASE 1: TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1950-1962 
 
 The first and second Taiwan Strait crises together constituted a time of great tension 
in East Asia. For the purpose of this study they represent one positive feedback cycle. 
According to the model of punctuated equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a self-
reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking. 
A negative feedback cycle is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force 
to create a stable output. I argue that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and 
the PRC on the Mainland comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change. 
Additionally, the actions of the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be 
characterized as a negative feedback cycle. 
 As noted in Chapter Three, for this study the independent variable is the positive 
feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of 
negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent 
variable. The bounds of this case are September 1950 to October 1962. In the first section of 
this chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the 
history of the two years leading up to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second section will 
discuss the independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between, 
and the second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years 
after the official end date of the second crisis until four years after that time. To establish a 
baseline for the dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the first 
 50 
crisis until two years prior to that time. Figure 3.5 in the previous chapter illustrates the 
timeframe of study. 
 
INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES 
 In this section I detail my observations of the independent and intervening variables. 
The first sub-section describes the two years prior to the first crisis. The second section 
details the two crises and the short span of time in between them. The final section is 
comprised of the events that transpired in the two years following the second crisis.  
 
SEPTEMBER 3, 1952 – SEPTEMBER 2, 1954 (IV2- & IntV2-) 
 During this span of time for the independent variable of the level of positive feedback 
generated between China and Taiwan, I observed a medium level of economic disruption and 
high levels of diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan. However, Taiwan was the 
first party to initiate high-level military disruption in the region. The intervening variable of 
the level of negative feedback from the United States was skewed in opposition to China and 
general support for Taiwan. There was medium-level of economic opposition, low to 
medium levels of diplomatic opposition, and high-level military opposition to China during 
these two years. See figure 4.2 for a breakdown of the independent and intervening variables 
for this period of time. 
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Figure 4.1: IV2- and IntV2- 
 
 
Aftermath of the Chinese Civil War 
 In the two years preceding the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, tensions between the PRC 
on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan were high. The Chinese Civil War had just ended 
and both the PRC and the ROC claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China. 
The United States was wearily working to keeping the peace between the two opposing 
governments. In 1952, the Korean truce talks entered a second year,83 and the Cold War 
raged between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Truman Administration and the 
Eisenhower Administration both had a vested interest in containing communism and, 
therefore, protecting the ROC on Taiwan from falling to the Communists on the Mainland. 
This show of support for Taiwan was an example of low diplomatic opposition to China. 
From 1950 through 1953, the U.S. Navy, looking for enemy resupply vessels, sent 
reconnaissance planes near the twelve-mile territorial limit of China. To obtain more useful 
photographs, pilots sometimes strayed over Chinese territory.84 This report demonstrates a 
high level of U.S. military opposition to China: naval forces, equipment, intelligence, and air 
support were all given to the ROC. 
                                                
83 WGBH Educational Foundation, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954,” PBS Online, last modified 1999, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/timeline/timeline2.html (accessed January 11, 2016). 
84 Bruce A. Elleman, High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950-1979, (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. 
Naval War College, 2012), p. 34. 
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Effects of McCarthyism in the United States 
 In 1953 the United States deepened ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. 
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected 1953, he decided to allow Chiang to 
attack the Chinese Communists. On February 2, in his State of the Union message, 
Eisenhower announced that he would be “issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no 
longer be employed to shield Communist China” from possible attack by Nationalist forces, 
adding that “we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.”85 In 
addition to supplying the ROC with naval forces, equipment and aid, intelligence and 
advisors, and air support, the United States issued this military sanction against the PRC. 
This statement is also an example of the low-level diplomatic opposition by publicly 
condemning China’s actions in Korea.  
 Despite the stabilizing actions of the United States, ROC leader, Chiang was still 
intent on taking the Mainland from the Communists by force and wanted to garner U.S. 
support for an invasion of the Mainland. In response to the news that Eisenhower was 
withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, on February 12, 1953, Chiang 
declared that he believed the Nationalist forces could attack Communist China at any time 
without UN sanction or fear of Soviet intervention.86 This indicated a high level of Taiwanese 
diplomatic disruption of the system. However, Chiang did not immediately order any military 
action.  
                                                
85 Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the Union Addresses of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Project Gutenberg eBooks, 
2004).  
86 WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.” 
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 The United States was still navigating the aftermath of the Korean War and 
continuing their anti-communist policy in 1953. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War armistice 
was signed, deescalating much of the tension in the region. 87  Weary of the Chinese 
Communists, on September 2, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that if 
China were to renew the Korean conflict or send Communist forces into Indochina, the 
United States might declare war against the Mainland.88 This diplomatic action helped to 
stabilize the region. 
 Military tensions only escalated after the United States publicly declared its intention 
to defend peace in the region. In August 1954, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 
15,000 to Matsu.89 This movement of troops to mount an assault of the Mainland was a clear 
indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. On August 11, 1954, PRC Premier 
Zhou En-lai declared that Taiwan must be liberated, warning that “foreign aggressors” who 
intervene would face “grave consequences.”90  This public statement was evidence of a high 
level of Chinese diplomatic disruption. Six days following this declaration, the United States 
warned China against attacking Taiwan in an attempt to stabilize the Strait.91 
 
Conclusion 
 Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruptions, as well as Chinese diplomatic 
disruption during this period were all observed at high levels. The intervening variable of 
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negative feedback from the United States was mostly directed at China. By aiding the ROC 
on Taiwan, U.S. military opposition to China was high. At the beginning of this period, U.S. 
diplomatic resistance to Chinese actions was low, but then increased to a medium level as 
conflict between the two polities increased. 
 
SEPTEMBER 3, 1954 – MAY 1, 1955 (IVD1 &IntVD1) 
 The independent variable of study, the level of positive feedback generated between 
China and Taiwan, was initially very high in this period as illustrated in figure 4.2. 
Taiwanese and Chinese military disruptions as well as Chinese diplomatic disruptions were 
at high levels. Toward the end of the crisis, these measures can be observed at medium and 
low levels. The intervening variable of the level of negative feedback from the United States 
was generally high during this period. U.S. military and diplomatic opposition to China were 
high, while diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was at first medium then at low levels. 
 
Figure 4.2: IVD1 and IntVD1 
 
 
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis began with the highly disruptive and aggressive 
military acts of the Chinese Communists. On September 3, 1954, the Chinese Communists 
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began artillery bombardment of the small Nationalist-held offshore island of Jinmen 
(Quemoy) and the Nationalists returned fire.92 Chiang then began to pressure the United 
States for a mutual defense treaty, only to discover that supposedly sympathetic leaders in 
Washington were unwilling.93  By bombing the offshore islands, PRC Chairman of the CCP 
Mao Zedong intended to deter a defense treaty, create friction between Washington and 
Taipei, and force the international community to pay attention to the Taiwan issue.94  
However, as a result of the bombing of the Offshore Islands, Dulles had no choice but to sign 
the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.95 A second U.S. reaction to the bombardment of the 
offshore islands came on September 4, when Dulles ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet back into 
the Strait.96 In addition to the military equipment and intelligence the United States supplied 
naval forces to Taiwan, indicating a medium level of military opposition to China. This was 
not only a measure to censure China, but also to constrain Chiang. 
 Despite U.S. containment efforts, the crisis deepened. On September 7, 1954, the 
Nationalists began large-scale air strikes against the Chinese Mainland.97 The following day, 
the United States joined seven other countries in signing a regional defense treaty, 
establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).98 This institution was formed 
to combat the spread of communism in Asia. On September 12, The U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff recommended the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China.99 In addition to 
the military support the United States already gave to the ROC, this additional military 
sanction against the PRC showed high-level U.S. military opposition to the Chinese 
Communists. 
 Later in 1954, the PRC not only opposed Taiwan, but also began to target U.S. 
operations in the Strait. In November the PLA began a campaign of bombing the Tachen 
islands.100 In retaliation for U.S. support for the ROC, China sentenced 13 U.S. Airmen, shot 
down over China in the Korean War, to long jail terms on November 11. This prompted 
further consideration of nuclear strikes against China.101 In the first days of December 1954, 
at the urging of Senator Knowland, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan.102 This treaty pledged American support for Taiwan 
against any attack from Mainland China. In response, the ROC made clear that it would not 
attack Mainland China without first consulting the United States.103 This measure made clear 
to the PRC that the United States would defend the ROC, but also placed a check on the 
actions of Chiang. Following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, on December 8, 
Zhou En-lai warned that the United States would face “grave consequences” if it did not 
withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, adding that Chinese “liberation” of Taiwan was 
“entirely in the purview of China’s sovereignty and a purely internal affair of China.”104  
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The Formosa Resolution 
 In 1955 the escalation of Chinese military aggression resulted in the Formosa 
Resolution. In January, Chinese Communists attacked Nationalist-held islands in the Taiwan 
Strait. In response, the Nationalists bombed Communist shipping along the China coast.105 
On January 18, Mainland Chinese forces seized Yijiangshan Island, 210 miles north of 
Formosa and, completely wiped out the ROC forces stationed there.106 Six days later on 
January 24, Zhou En-lai reiterated his intention to invade Taiwan.107 In light of these 
escalations, the Formosa Resolution passed both houses of U.S. Congress on January 29. The 
resolution authorized the president to employ American forces to defend Formosa and the 
Pescadores Islands, along with other territories as appropriate, to defend them against armed 
attack.108 The ambiguity of this resolution helped cool the heels of both Zhou En-lai and 
Chiang. Chinese Communists did not want a war with the United States and Taiwan was not 
sure which islands the United States would help defend.  
 Following the Formosa Resolution, the United States began a campaign opposing 
Chinese aggression to try and deescalate the Taiwan Strait using nuclear deterrence. On 
February 7, 1955, Nationalist troops began the withdrawal from the Dachen Islands with the 
assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.109 Two days later, the Senate ratified The U.S.-
Nationalist Chinese Mutual Security Pact, which did not apply to islands along the Chinese 
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Mainland.110 In a nationally televised address on March 8, Dulles warned China not to 
underestimate U.S. determination to meet aggression in East Asia, adding that the United 
States could employ “new and powerful weapons of precision.”111 At a National Security 
Council meeting on March 10 Dulles stated that the American people have to be prepared for 
possible nuclear strikes against China.112 These statements became increasingly public. On 
March 15, Dulles publicly stated that the United States was seriously considering using 
atomic weapons in the Quemoy-Matsu area.113 The next day, Eisenhower publicly stated, “A-
bombs can be used…as you would use a bullet.”114 This talk of nuclear weapons grew so 
intense that on March 25, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral stated that the 
president was planning “to destroy Red China’s military potential,” predicting war by mid-
April.115 
 
Gradual De-escalation 
 Even as they prepared for war against China, the Eisenhower Administration feared 
that such a war could lead to war with the Soviet Union. While Eisenhower was prepared for 
a war against China, some domestic constituents in the United States advocated for U.S. 
recognition of the PRC. In the spring of 1955 Eisenhower sent a mission to persuade Chiang 
to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu because they were exposed. The President was 
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unsuccessful; Chiang would not withdraw. Subsequently Eisenhower provided the 
Nationalists with air-to-air missiles that enabled them to sweep Mao's MIGs from the skies 
over the Taiwan Strait, and sent to Quemoy and Matsu 8-inch howitzers capable of firing 
nuclear shells.116 In an article in Foreign Affairs published in March, Arthur H. Dean, a U.S. 
negotiator in the Korean armistice talks and former law partner of Dulles, advocated for U.S. 
recognition of Communist China.117 
 The Chinese Communists also had no wish to go to war with the United States and 
sought to negotiate an end to the crisis. On March 23, 1955, China stated at the Afro-Asian 
Conference that it was ready to negotiate on Taiwan.118 Zhou En-lai stated that Communist 
China did not want war with the United States and was willing to negotiate with the U.S. 
government. The United States responded that it would agree to negotiations if Nationalist 
China participated in the discussion as equals.119 This was a large milestone towards the end 
of the crisis, which demonstrated that Chinese diplomatic disruption was declining to low 
levels. On May 1, 1955, the shelling of Quemoy-Matsu ceased, ending the crisis.120 
 
Conclusion 
 During this period, the independent variable of positive feedback generated between 
the ROC and the PRC generally started at high levels and gradually decreased in intensity. 
Chinese military and diplomatic disruptions began at high levels and decreased as the desire 
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to go to war with the United States waned. Taiwan demonstrated a high level of military 
disruption and a medium level of diplomatic disruption. U.S. military opposition to China 
was high and its diplomatic resistance showed both medium and high levels. The United 
States opposed the Taiwanese with high levels of military deterrence and low and medium 
levels of diplomatic resistance.  
 
MAY 2, 1955 – AUGUST 22, 1958 (IVD2 & IntVD2) 
 The time between the crises was uncertain for the ROC, the PRC, and the United 
States. As seen in figure 4.3, ROC and PRC military disruption during this period reflected 
both low and high levels. Taiwan’s diplomatic disruption was at a medium level. China’s 
diplomatic disruption can also be observed at low and high levels. The intervening variable, 
divided into opposition to Taiwan and Chinese actions was similarly turbulent. U.S. 
diplomatic opposition is observed at medium levels for both China and Taiwan. Consistently, 
the United States indirectly opposed the Chinese Communists with a high level of military 
resistance by aiding ROC military efforts. 
 
Figure 4.3: IVD2 and IntVD2 
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Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis 
 In the time directly following the ceasefire, which ended the second crisis, the PRC 
worked to keep their diplomatic disruption at a low level. On August 1, 1955, in an attempt 
to improve relations with the United States, China released the 11 captured airmen previously 
sentenced to jail terms.121 Zhou En-lai proposed a meeting with Dulles to discuss Taiwan and 
other problems the following year.122 
 Despite the deescalating disruption of the PRC, the United States, due to its anti-
communist predilections, was reluctant to negotiate with them. In addition to this reluctance 
the United States had a vested interest in maintaining its relationship with the ROC on 
Taiwan. On June 12, 1956, Dulles rejected the Chinese offer of discussions because of the 
short notice and because 13 captured Americans were still imprisoned in China.123 Even after 
the Communist government on the Mainland decided it would not want a war against the 
United States, Chiang still had designs to take back the Mainland by force. In the summer of 
1956, Chiang initiated a secret “Plan K” for joint navy, marine, and army landings in Fujian 
and Guangdong provinces. Scaled back from proposals to attack Shanghai or the Shandong 
peninsula, nearer Beijing, this venture, Chang argued to Washington, would recoup losses in 
Vietnam and Korea. Washington refused to assist.124  One last illustration of the conciliatory 
agenda of the PRC and the distrustful nature of the United States in the period was an 
incident involving visas for newsmen. On August 7, 1956, one day after the Chinese 
government offered visas to 15 American newsmen who had requested them, the U.S. State 
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Department announced that it would continue to bar travel to China as long as it held 
American “political hostages.”125 
 The United States continued its policy of denying travel to and from Mainland China 
into 1957. On June 25, 1957, Eleanor Roosevelt revealed that the State Department had 
denied her permission to travel to China and interview Chinese leaders.126 Dulles authorized 
24 news organizations to send correspondents to China for a seven-month trial period on 
August 22, but would not issue reciprocal visas to Chinese newsmen.127 In response, on 
August 25, the Chinese People’s Daily denounced the State Department’s plan as 
“completely unacceptable to the Chinese people.”128 The PRC had finally had enough of U.S. 
policy and on October 15, 1957, signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union to develop 
Chinese nuclear capability.129  
 At the same time as this secret nuclear deal, several civil and political leaders within 
the United States called for improved relations with the PRC. In the October 1957 edition of 
Foreign Affairs, Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) called for a new foreign policy 
toward China, describing existing U.S. policy as “exaggeratedly military” and “probably too 
rigid.”130 On December 12, the United States suspended on-again off-again Geneva talks with 
China.131 
 In 1958 the levels of the independent and intervening variables fluctuated. On 
January 1, 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward on the Mainland, aimed at 
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accomplishing the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly faster pace 
and with greater results. Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies. The 
"soft" foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, to which China 
had subscribed in the mid-1950s, gave way to a "hard" line in 1958.132 In May of that year, 
the Americans for Democratic Action called for negotiations toward diplomatic recognition 
of Communist China “as a means of establishing the normal channels of communication 
between the two nations.”133 Despite these sympathizers, the Administration continued to 
mistrust and oppose the PRC. 
 In June 1958, the Chinese Communists demanded a resumption of Sino-American 
ambassadorial talks,134 even while China’s first atomic reactor began operating.135 In July, the 
Chinese Nationalists began to anticipate a Communist move against the Offshore Islands. 
Urging the United States to commit itself publicly to the defense of the Offshore Islands, they 
also sought modern equipment for their armed forces, including the delivery of American 
Sidewinder missiles.136 While the United States refused to issue a public statement indicating 
that it would defend Quemoy, it did increase its military assistance to the Government of the 
Republic of China (ROC) and began intensive contingency planning for a crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait. The basic policy of the American government was that it would help defend 
the Offshore Islands only if necessary for the defense of Taiwan. American officials in the 
field were authorized to assist the ROC in planning the defense of the islands, and assumed 
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that nuclear weapons would be used to counter anything but very light probing by the 
Chinese Communists.137 This is evidence of high-level military opposition to the PRC. 
 
Renewed Military Conflict 
 In July 1958, the first military action came in the form of air clashes over the Taiwan 
Strait and the Chinese Mainland.138 On July 22, China announced the start of a campaign to 
“liberate” Taiwan and began building up forces opposite the island.139 In early August, 
officials in Washington became concerned with the possibility of a crisis, although they did 
not expect the Chinese Communists to launch a major military attack. A consensus 
developed that a high-level decision should be made as to what the American reaction would 
be to an air-sea interdiction against the Offshore Islands. There was also strong pressure for a 
diplomatic warning to the Chinese Communists that the United States would not tolerate the 
fall of Quemoy.140  
 The United States and China briefly attempted to improve relations in order to 
deescalate the situation. On August 1, 1958, the United States and China began the first 
ambassadorial talks aimed at improving Sino-American relations. The talks secured the 
release of American POWs and spies in China and Chinese scientists detained in the United 
States during the Korean War. The talks, held first in Geneva, and after 1958, in Warsaw, 
continued on and off until 1972. They were the only point of direct contact between Beijing 
and Washington for 16 years.141 Despite this channel of communication, tensions continued 
                                                
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1955-1959.” 
140 Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” pp. v-vi. 
141 Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China 
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky), p. 225. 
 65 
to mount. On August 22, the U.S. government decided it would participate in the defense of 
the Offshore Islands if they came under attack. This demonstrated the high-level military 
opposition of the United States to the PRC. It was agreed that, as an attempt to deter a 
Chinese Communist move, a public statement clarifying the American position would be 
issued in the form of an exchange of letters between Dulles and Representative Thomas 
Morgan.142 
 
Conclusion 
 The independent variable of study broken into Chinese and Taiwanese disruption 
varied during this time. Taiwanese and Chinese military disruption as well as Chinese 
diplomatic disruption were observed at both low and high levels during this period. The ROC 
was diplomatically disruptive at a medium level. The United States matched this and 
diplomatically opposed Taiwan at a medium level. There were high levels of U.S. military 
opposition to China and medium levels of diplomatic opposition.  
 
AUGUST 23, 1958 – OCTOBER 6, 1958 (IVD3 & IntVD3) 
 In the beginning of this period the independent variable—positive feedback generated 
between China and Taiwan—began at high levels in both military and diplomatic categories. 
Chinese Communist disruption began to taper off once they learned the United States was 
willing to use nuclear weapons, while Chiang was more difficult to pacify.  
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Figure 4.4: IVD3 and IntVD3 
 
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 The crisis officially began with Chinese military disruption. On August 23, 1958, at 
6:30pm Taiwan time, the Chinese Communists resumed a massive artillery bombardment of 
Quemoy and Matsu, and threatened invasion.143 The initial fire was directed at a ceremony 
welcoming the Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister to Quemoy. Artillery fire remained 
heavy during the first two weeks of the crisis and was directed mainly at incoming convoys. 
At the same time, a number of air engagements took place in which the Chinese Nationalists 
very quickly demonstrated their superiority over the Chinese Communists.144 Chinese patrol 
boats blockaded Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts. This was 
accompanied by an aggressive propaganda assault on the United States, threats against 
American naval ships, and a declaration of intent to "liberate" Taiwan. Quemoy, which lies 
about 10 kilometers from the Mainland, had been used by the Nationalists to mount raids on 
Mainland China.145 
 The United States in response to this outbreak of violence, had to decide to what 
extent they would be involved in the crisis. From August 23-24, 1958, officials in the 
Pentagon and the State Department worked on position papers for a meeting to be held at the 
White House on the 25th of August. The basic position paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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urged the United States to involve itself in the defense of the Offshore Islands, stating bluntly 
that, although initial operations might have to be conventional for political reasons, atomic 
strikes against the Chinese Mainland would eventually be necessary if the Chinese 
Communists were to be stopped effectively and quickly.146 
 Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists showed only signs of increasing the conflict. 
During the first two weeks of the crisis, Chinese Communist propaganda tended to downplay 
the events in the Taiwan Strait. The People’s Daily simply reported what was in fact taking 
place. Soviet propaganda followed the same line by denying that a major crisis was 
occurring.147 The Chinese Communists, however, did begin to beam a series of radio 
broadcasts at Quemoy, calling upon the garrison to surrender and warning that it was cut off 
and isolated.148 
 Once a decision had been made in Washington, the level of military resistance to the 
Chinese Communists was maintained at a high level, with the naval and air support, 
intelligence, and equipment and aid sent to the ROC. After deliberation on August 25, 
approval was given to the Navy paper authorizing the Commander in Chief of Pacific 
Command (CINCPAC) to reinforce American capability and to prepare to escort supply 
ships to the Offshore Islands. CINCPAC was also authorized to prepare to assist in the event 
of a major assault against Quemoy. Aware of the problems that would arise if the Chinese 
Nationalists were to know the full extent of U.S. commitment to the Offshore Islands, 
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Washington ordered the Taiwan Defense Commander not to inform the ROC of planned 
American moves.149   
 Towards the end of August, U.S. military actions in the Taiwan Strait and in the Far 
East in general were substantially increased in order to publicize U.S. determination to the 
Chinese Communists. The Chinese Nationalists, who were reacting favorably to the steps 
taken by the United States, continued to press for a public statement that the United States 
would regard an attack on Quemoy as an attack on Taiwan. They also asked for a U.S. 
convoy to Quemoy and stand-by authority for the Taiwan Defense Commander to participate 
in the defense of Quemoy in the event of an all-out Chinese Communist assault.150 On August 
28, American officials in the field were reporting that the critical issue was the supplying of 
Quemoy, and attention then came to be focused on this problem.151 The following day, a 
second meeting at the White House authorized American escorts for ROC convoys to within 
three miles of Quemoy. This decision was immediately disclosed to the ROC, and plans were 
made for such convoying.152 
 
U.S. Consideration of Nuclear Weapons 
  In early September, Chinese Communist military action against the Offshore Islands 
began to taper off,153 yet the U.S. government began discussing the use of nuclear weapons. 
On September 2, 1958, Dulles met with members of the Joint Chiefs and other top officials to 
formulate the basic American position on the crisis and to define American policy in the 
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event of a Chinese Communist invasion of the Offshore Islands. At this meeting it was 
debated whether or not Quemoy could be defended without nuclear weapons. Additionally, 
they discussed the more general question of the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons for 
deterrence. The consensus reached was that the use of nuclear weapons would ultimately be 
necessary for the defense of Quemoy, but that the United States should limit itself initially to 
use conventional forces.154 The Chinese Communists brought their artillery action to a virtual 
ceasefire after this date.155 
 The United States wanted to make clear to the PRC that they would defend the 
Offshore Islands. The Chinese Communists responded with low and medium level 
diplomatic measures. On September 3, 1958, the next meeting Dulles called with the Joint 
Chiefs and other top officials authorized a formal paper urging the President to agree to an 
American defense of the Offshore Islands.156 At the same time it was recognized that it was 
important to make unmistakably clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States was 
prepared to intervene in order to deter a possible Chinese Communist move. Following this, 
Eisenhower met with Dulles at Newport,157 and then the President returned to Washington for 
another White House consultation on the crisis. The following day, Chinese Communists laid 
claim to all waters within 12 miles of its coasts, including the islands of Jinmen (Quemoy), 
Mazu (Matsu) and other Nationalist-held islands in those waters. The same day, Dulles issues 
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a statement that the United States “would not hesitate” to use armed force “in insuring the 
defense of” Taiwan.158 
 
Gradual Reduction of Disruption 
 The conflict began to deescalate when Communist China expressed a willingness to 
negotiate; however, China also continued to call for the liberation of Taiwan. On September 
6, Chinese Communist Premier Zhou En-lai issued a public statement offering to reopen the 
Sino-American ambassadorial talks.159 The United States agreed to the talks the same day.160 
The Chinese Communist People’s Daily devoted most of its front page to Zhou’s statement 
and thereafter began to publicize the developing crisis. Meanwhile, the Mainland Chinese 
inaugurated a series of public meetings calling for the liberation of Taiwan.161 
 Chiang sought to bring the United States into a war against the Chinese Communists 
in an effort to take back Greater China by force. The ROC, with U.S. military assistance and 
convoy support starting September 7, gradually improved its ability to land supplies on 
Quemoy. It also continued to press for greater U.S. involvement in the crisis and for 
permission to bomb the Mainland. While ROC officials still affirmed that they would try to 
honor their commitment to consult the United States before attacking the Mainland, they 
stressed that attacks on the Mainland might be necessary. Apparently the ROC was still 
trying to manipulate events so as to draw the United States into a greater military 
involvement against the Chinese Communists. U.S. officials in the field, attempting to 
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develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, sought to aid the ROC 
resupply effort and to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the United States would 
be involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands. In addition, military officers were 
engaged in crash planning for possible large-scale conventional operations in the Taiwan 
Strait. This contingency planning produced a bitter reaction among some officials, who felt 
that large-scale conventional operations were unrealistic.162 
 During September, public opposition to American involvement in defense of the 
Offshore Islands continued to mount in the United States and abroad. American officials 
were aware of this opposition and felt constrained by it. The United States sought to answer 
its critics in a series of public statements and to warn Beijing that the United States would be 
involved in the defense of Quemoy.163 On September 11, 1958, Eisenhower indicated that 
Quemoy would not be permitted to fall. There was considerable uncertainty in Washington 
during September as to whether or not the Communist blockade could be broken by 
American-escorted convoys.164 After some further negotiations with the Chinese Communists 
as well as the Chinese Nationalists, U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam held the first of the 
renewed Warsaw talks with Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang on September 15. 
During this and subsequent meetings, the United States pressed for a ceasefire in the Taiwan 
Strait while the Chinese Communists demanded that the United States withdraw from the 
Taiwan area.165  Though no consensus was reached, the crisis subsided over the next few 
weeks. In mid September Chinese Communist propaganda appeared to be aimed at 
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minimizing the consequences of their failure to take Quemoy and, at the same time, at 
exacerbating U.S.-ROC relations. 166  Even while tensions were subsiding, the political 
deadlock between the PRC and the ROC was settling into place. 
 The United States and China wanted to end the conflict, while Chiang was still 
adamant about recovering the Mainland. On September 25, U.S. officials concluded that the 
Chinese Communist blockade could be broken and that there was no need to pursue a 
diplomatic course toward a political settlement.167 On September 30, Dulles told the press that 
it would be foolhardy to sustain large deployments on the precarious Offshore Islands if a 
ceasefire could be negotiated. 168 Dulles compelled Chiang to agree to a communiqué 
declaring that Taiwan would rely on political means to recover the Mainland.169 In a radio 
broadcast from Beijing on October 6, 1958, Chinese Minister of National Defense Peng 
Dehuai offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the nationalists and announced that the 
PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week, if the United States ceased to escort 
ROC convoys.170 This temporary ceasefire officially ended the crisis.  
 
Conclusion 
 The independent variable of positive feedback between China and Taiwan began at 
high levels of military and diplomatic disruption in this period. Chinese disruption 
deescalated once they realized that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons; 
Chiang was more difficult to deter. The United States maintained a high level of military 
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opposition to Chinese disruption through their aid to the ROC and medium and high levels of 
diplomatic opposition. 
 
OCTOBER 7, 1958-OCTOBER 7, 1960 (IVD2+ & InvtVD2+) 
 In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, there was initially 
some on-and-off conflict coming out of the ceasefire, but then tensions diminished. The 
Chinese Communists suspended their fire for a final time and the Soviets annulled their 
promise to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and 
medium levels of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition 
to the PRC.  
 
Figure 4.5: IV2+ and IntV2+ 
 
Slow Process of Reinstituting a Political Truce  
 In the two years following the second crisis there was a brief period of military 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On October 13, 1958, the Chinese Communists announced that 
they were continuing the ceasefire for another two weeks.171 The Chinese Communists 
announced that they were resuming fire on October 20, because an American ship had 
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intruded into Chinese Communist territorial waters. 172  On October 25, the Chinese 
Communists said that they were again suspending their fire. This time they declared that they 
would not fire on even-numbered days against airfields, beaches, and wharves if there were 
no American escort.173 Following this latest ceasefire, Chinese Communist propaganda took 
the line that they had never been interested in capturing only the Offshore Islands but were 
determined instead to capture both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands at the same time.174  
 In 1959, the crisis situation cooled off. On June 20, 1959, the Soviet Union annulled 
its secret October 1957 promise to help China develop a nuclear arsenal.175 On December 7, 
the Rockefeller Report on future U.S. foreign policy needs called for improved relations with 
the Chinese people, while acknowledging China’s hostile stance towards the United States.176  
Public opinion in the United States in 1960 continued to advocate for U.S. recognition of the 
PRC. On May 23, 1960, the “Liberal Project,” a group of House members, scholars and 
scientists, released a study advocating opening direct communications with Beijing and 
withdrawing U.S. opposition to U.N. membership for the PRC.177 There was some backlash 
from interest groups who were still staunchly anti-communist. The Committee of One 
Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations called on the 
American public to support its campaign opposing concessions to the Beijing government on 
June 16, 1960.178  The Eisenhower Administration was still a firm supporter of the ROC on 
Taiwan. In a visit to Taiwan on June 18, Eisenhower told a rally, “The United States does not 
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recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Beijing to speak for 
all the Chinese people. In the United Nations we support the Republic of China, a founding 
member, as the only rightful representative of China in that organization.”179 
 
Conclusion 
 In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, after minimal 
conflict coming out of the ceasefire, tensions diminished. The Soviets annulled their promise 
to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and medium levels 
of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition to the PRC.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The dependent variable of study is the level of conflict. This section discusses the 
dependent variable in the two years following the independent and intervening variables. 
Additionally, this section examines the two years prior to the independent and intervening 
variables. 
 
OCTOBER 8, 1960-OCTOBER 8, 1962 (DV2+) 
 In the period DV2+, diplomatic conflict can be observed at level two: China and 
Taiwan were open to third-party mediation but closed to negotiating with one another. Third 
party involvement (TPI) can be observed at levels two, three, and four.  
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 During this period, both the United States and the PRC showed a desire to negotiate, 
while Chiang remained militant. On March 17, 1961, Sino-American ambassadorial talks 
between the United States and the PRC resumed in Warsaw.180 In the spring of that year, 
Chiang’s military chief sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. The U.S. 
refusal to supply the shells shut this plan down.181  
 While the United States would not support the military designs of the ROC on 
Taiwan, it continued to defend their position as the representative of China in the United 
Nations. In August 1961, President Kennedy secretly promised Chiang that the United States 
would veto any UN decision to seat the Beijing government, and agreed to cooperate with 
Chiang’s forces in covert operations against the Mainland.182 On December 1, 1961, there 
was debate in the UN General Assembly on whether to admit the PRC. This was the first 
time since 1950 that the question of China’s admission made it to the General Assembly.183 
However, on December 15, the UN General Assembly rejected this proposal.184  
 In 1962 the Sino-Indian War broke out, leaving the PRC few resources to deal with 
Taiwan. The U.S. Air Force in Taiwan established the Taipei Air Station. On June 27, 1962, 
President Kennedy stated in a press conference:  
One possibility is that there might be aggressive action against the offshore 
islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In that event, the policy of this country will be 
that established seven years ago under the Formosa Resolution. The United 
States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the 
Pescadores. In the last crisis in the Taiwan area in 1958, President Eisenhower 
made it clear that the United States would not remain inactive in the face of 
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any aggressive action against the offshore islands, which might threaten 
Formosa.185  
 
He went on to state that he was opposed to using force in the region, but would do so in order 
to protect Taiwan. 
 
SEPTEMBER 3, 1950-SEPTEMBER 2, 1952 (DV2-) 
 During the period prior to the independent and intervening variables, third party 
involvement quickly escalated from low to high on a four-point scale. Diplomatic conflict 
was observed at a level three and military conflict at a level four. 
 In 1950, the U.S. government considered the conflict between the ROC and the PRC 
to be self-contained. The United States would not aid the ROC in any other way than 
ensuring they retained their seat in the UN General Assembly, but only to ensure that the 
Chinese Communists were barred from entry. As a result of their disillusionment with the 
ROC due to its corruptions and inefficiencies, the Truman Administration issued a statement 
on January 5, 1950 that they would not intervene for the defense of Taiwan.186 On the 19th of 
September, the PRC was barred once again from taking China’s seat in the UN General 
Assembly.187  
 As the war in Korea was breaking out, military conflict in the region escalated. On 
the 30th of September 1950, Zhou En-lai warned that China would not stand idly by if “the 
imperialists wantonly [invaded] the territory of North Korea.”188 South Korean troops crossed 
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the 38th parallel into North Korea on October 1.189 The next day, Zhou En-lai formally 
notified the Indian ambassador to China that if the United States entered North Korea, China 
would intervene.190 In response, U.S. troops, led by General Douglas MacArthur, cross the 
38th parallel into North Korea.191 In November, Chinese troops attacked U.S. forces on both 
Western and Eastern fronts. The U.S. forces withdrew.192 On November 26, as UN troops, led 
by General MacArthur, approached Korea’s northern border, Chinese troops entered the war 
in force, driving MacArthur south of the 38th parallel.193 On December 8, the U.S. Commerce 
Department announced a total trade embargo on China. It would remain in place for 21 
years.194  
 By 1951, the United States military was fully invested in the region and in the 
struggle against Communist China. On February 1, 1950, at the urging of the United States, 
the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution branding China an aggressor in the Korea 
conflict.195 On April 11, President Truman dismissed General MacArthur from all commands 
in East Asia after repeatedly ignoring White House orders not to publicly demand that the 
war be expanded against Communist China. 196  Shortly after that, the U.S. Defense 
Department announced the appointment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group for 
Taiwan, on whose recommendation the United States resumed direct military aid to the 
Nationalists.197 
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 The U.S. government used the Nationalists on Taiwan as a tool against Communist 
China. On May 18, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk set 
the tone for U.S.-China policy for the next two decades when he stated, “The regime in 
Peiping [Beijing]…is not the government of China… We recognize the national government 
of the Republic of China, [which will]…continue to receive important aid and assistance 
from the United States.”198 The UN unanimously adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling 
for “every state” in the world to withhold arms or strategic materials from Communist 
China.199 On the 10th of July 1951, truce talks began between a U.S.-led delegation and North 
Korean-Chinese Communist representatives.200 Korean truce talks entered their second year 
in 1952.201 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables in terms of the 
levels of military and diplomatic disruption in a total of five time periods. I expect overall 
trend of the level of disruption to form a bimodal curve. Tensions escalated in the two years 
prior to the first crisis, reached a peak during the first crisis, subsided by a small degree, then 
increased again during the second crisis. In the two years following the second crisis, 
tensions deescalated once more. This sequence of events points to a positive feedback cycle. 
The actions of the United States to quell the conflict across the Taiwan Strait formed the 
negative feedback cycle that eventually reinstated stability. The next chapter will cover Case 
2: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CASE 2 THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1991-2004 
 
 The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Taiwan Confrontation together constituted one 
positive feedback cycle for the purpose of this study. According to the model of punctuated 
equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change 
occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle is a self-
correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. I argue 
that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Mainland 
comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change. Additionally, the actions of 
the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be characterized as a negative feedback 
cycle. 
 As noted in Chapter Three, the independent variable of this study is the positive 
feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of 
negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent 
variable. The bounds of this case are June 1991 to May 2002. In the first section of this 
chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the history of 
the two years leading up to the Third Taiwan Trait Crisis. The second section will discuss the 
independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between, and the 
second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the Taiwan 
Confrontation. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years after the official 
end date of the confrontation until four years after that time. To establish a baseline for the 
dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the third crisis until two 
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years prior to that time. Figure 3.6 in Chapter Three: Methodology illustrates the timeframe 
of study. 
 Due to the complexity of organizations and historical figures in this chapter, I briefly 
summarize here the relevant actors. Several significant events have transpired in the period of 
détente between the second and third Taiwan Strait crises. Taiwan lost its seat in the UN to 
the PRC in 1971.202 In the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique, the United States recognized 
the PRC as the legitimate government of Greater China and acknowledged that Taiwan was 
part of China.203 Even as the United States cultivated its relationship with China, the 1979 
Taiwan Relations Act “provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the 
United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in 
maintaining its defensive capability.”204 The United States, seeking to promote democracy 
around the world, continued to aid Taiwan with arms deals205 and foreign direct investment.206 
Taiwan democratized in the early 1990s and the process was complete with the election of 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian in 2000, ending the 
Kuomintang’s (KMT) monopoly on power.207  
 Relations between China and Taiwan began to improve in the late 1980s and early 
1990s when both polities expressed interest in deepening economic and diplomatic relations. 
On the 21st of November 1990, the ROC created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) as a 
semi-official organization to handle technical and business matters with the PRC. Though 
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technically a private organization, it is funded through the government and controlled by the 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of the ROC 
central government). Following suit, the PRC created the Association for Relations Across 
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the 16th of December 1991 for the same purpose as the SEF. 
This context situates the events of the next section into an overarching history. 
 
INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES 
 In this section, I discuss the independent and intervening variables concurrently. The 
independent variable is the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan, 
while the intervening variable is the level of negative feedback from the United States. This 
chronology of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis is divided into three sections for the 
independent and intervening variables: in the two years prior, during, and in the two years 
following the crisis. 
 
JUNE 9, 1993 – JUNE 8, 1995 (IV2- & IntV2-) 
 In the period of time between June 9, 1993 and June 8, 1995, diplomatic relations 
between China and Taiwan grew increasingly complicated. While both the ROC and PRC 
publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, each wanted unification to be carried out 
on its own terms. The differences in the demands of each political entity caused tensions to 
rise and the United States to seek greater involvement. 
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Figure 5.1: IV2- and IntV2- 
 
Early Attempts at Cooperation 
 In late June 1993, the ROC and PRC governments entered negotiations to discuss 
technical and business related issues across the Taiwan Strait. On June 24, 1993, Jiang Zemin 
took over as the director of PRC Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group.208 The Taiwan Affairs 
Office (TAO) published a White Paper, “the Taiwan Problem and the Unification of 
China,”209 on August 31, 1993. This paper reiterated both the opposition of the PRC to the 
entry of Taiwan into the UN, and the support of the PRC for peaceful reunification under the 
“one country, two systems” framework. This document demonstrated a high level of Chinese 
diplomatic disruption by implying the subordinate status of the ROC to the PRC. Despite this 
view and in ignorance of ROC conditions for unification, on December 18, 1993, officials of 
ARATS came to Taiwan for negotiations for the first time.210  
 In early 1994, the political organs on Taiwan and the Mainland demonstrated their 
willingness to cooperate with one another on a variety of issues. On January 7, 1994, MAC 
announced the “Guiding Principle on cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges at the Current Stage,” 
stressing the need to promote cross-Strait cultural exchanges, for mutual benefit and the 
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cultural development of the two sides.211 The first Chiao-Tang talks were held In Beijing on 
February 2, between officials at the vice-chairman level of the SEF and the ARATS. The 
meeting ended on February 5, and the two men issued "the joint press release by Mr. Chiao 
Jen-ho and Tang Shubei."212 Even as both sides were seeking to foster interdependence, the 
process was not without snags. At the fourth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang 
Talks held in Beijing on March 25, the two sides discussed three issues but failed to make 
any breakthrough.213  
 
The Qiandao Incident and Its Effects 
 PRC attempts at diplomatic cooperation fell on deaf ears after the Qiandao incident. 
On March 31, 1994, twenty-four Taiwanese tourists were kidnapped and murdered in the 
Qiandao Lake scenic area, in Zhejiang, PRC. Insensitive treatment by the local government 
and police force following the event, including censoring information and unprofessional 
criminal investigating procedures, led to public backlash in Taiwan against the PRC 
government.214 On April 9, ROC President Lee Teng-hui publicly criticized the Communist 
Party of China as acting “like bandits,” and claimed that the case was robbery committed by 
Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers, as had been claimed by Taiwanese intelligence. 
This spurred an increase in public support for independence.215 On April 30, Lee spoke of 
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“the sorrow of the Taiwanese” for being deserted by the international community and 
without any international status.216  
 In light of these events the United States tried not to exacerbate tensions in the region. 
The United States did not afford Lee typical diplomatic courtesy when he was refueling his 
jet in Hawaii on May 3, 1994. According to The Los Angeles Times, “Lee was limited by the 
Clinton Administration to only a short refueling stop in order not to offend the People's 
Republic of China.”217 Later in the month of May, MAC made public the "Position Paper on 
Direct Transportation between the Two Sides," noting that direct transportation would be 
launched only when the dignity, order, and safety are ensured for the two sides.218 In a move 
that indirectly opposed the actions of Taiwan, on May 31, 1994, the United States decided to 
de-couple the issues of China’s human rights record and the Most Favored Nations 
treatment.219  
 Pro-independence sentiment continued to increase on Taiwan. In June, the World 
United Formosans for Independence passed a draft constitution of the Republic of Taiwan, 
chose a new national flag, and composed a new national anthem.220 Official diplomacy, while 
on the surface in the spirit of cooperation, was in reality a demonstration of the near-
insurmountable differences between Taiwan and the Mainland. On July 25, MAC published 
the white paper, “Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” 221  in eight languages. 222  This 
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document stated, “The fundamental reason why China [could not] be unified [was] not, as 
Peking would have it, that a section of the Taiwan population [wished] to separate itself from 
China, neither [was] it due to the interference of certain foreign forces.” 223 Instead, it was due 
to the political and early economic disasters of the CCP regime.224 The ROC rejected the “one 
country, two systems” doctrine, preferring one country, two political entities.225 
 
Continued Diplomacy 
 This policy difference did not stop the negotiation between the ARATS and the SEF 
that was already in motion. On July 30, 1994, the fifth functional meeting after the first Koo-
Wang Talks was held in Taipei.226 The second Chiao-Tang Talks ran from August 4 to 7 in 
Taipei, where the SEF and the ARATS vice chairmen discussed the repatriation of criminals, 
illegal entrants, and hijackers; as well as the settlement of fishery disputes.227  
 Even while the talks between the ARATS and the SEF continued, domestic policy 
and decision-makers in the ROC veered towards escalating conflict. Because the Mainland 
military had staged exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province, and Beijing used a 
zero-sum attitude to isolate and oppress the ROC’s bid to accede to the United Nations and 
participation in the Asian Games, on September 23, 1994, Premier Lien Chan said the cross-
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Strait relations could not advance into the middle-stage under the “Guidelines for National 
Unification.”228 
 Due in part to these increasing tensions, on September 27, 1994, Winston Lord, 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs announced “The Taiwan Policy 
Review” of the United States.229 In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee he stated that the United States neither wanted to “interfere in nor mediate” the 
unification process of China and Taiwan, but would “welcome any evolution in relations 
between Taipei and Beijing that [was] mutually agreed upon and peacefully reached.”230 Lord 
went on to say that despite China’s transition to a market economy, it still adhered “to a 
repressive political system.”231 After this policy review the United States continued to provide 
material and training to Taiwan to promote its self-defense capability, as mandated by the 
Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales remained consistent with both the Taiwan Relations Act 
and the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué. In closing, Lord stated that the administration strongly 
opposed Congressional attempts to legislate visits by top leaders of the ROC to the United 
States, for fear that it would destabilize relations with the PRC. 
 The United States was pressured to increase its involvement in the Taiwan Strait 
when USS Kitty Hawk and China’s submarine and jet fighters had a brief military encounter 
in the Yellow Sea.232 China served notice through a U.S. military official in Beijing that the 
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next time such a situation arose, China's orders would be to shoot to kill.233 Regardless of 
these events, in late December, the sixth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang Talks 
was held in Nanjing from December 22 to 27. However, no agreement was reached.234 
 In early 1995 this breach between the SEF-ARATS negotiations and relations 
between decision-makers in the PRC and ROC governments continued to widen. On January 
1, 1995, Jiang Zemin announced his Eight-Point Taiwan policy.235 First, Jiang opposed 
Taiwanese independence and would “not promise not to use force. If used, force [would] not 
be directed against our compatriots in Taiwan, but against the foreign forces who 
[intervened] in China's reunification and [went] in for the independence of Taiwan.”236 Jiang 
then announced the PRC’s desire to promote economic interdependence and to accept 
invitations to visit Taiwan. In response on April 8, President Lee responded with his own Six 
Points.237 “Two of his points paralleled Jiang’s: increasing bilateral exchanges based on 
Chinese culture (Lee’s Point 2) and enhancing economic relations.”238 Lee not so subtly 
called the Mainland an “economic hinterland.”239 He called for unification based on the 
reality that the two sides were governed by two governments, neither subordinate to the other 
(Lee’s Point 1). Lee then suggested in Point 4 that both sides could meet in a natural manner 
on international occasions. This last, was directly contrary to Jiang’s eighth point, which 
repudiated third-party involvement in Chinese domestic affairs. 
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The Tipping Point 
 This stalemate grew increasingly fragile when on May 22, 1955, the U.S. Congress 
agreed to issue ROC President Lee a visa for a visit to his alma mater, Cornell University.240 
Too early to formulate a response to this U.S. action, the ARATS and the SEF met as normal 
and began to make progress. On May 27, the ARATS’ Tang Shubei came to Taiwan for 
talks.241 The first preparatory consultation for the Second Round of the Koo-Wang Talks 
reached eight items of consensus, and decided to hold the second round of preparatory 
consultation talks in June in preparation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks in 
Beijing.242  
 Despite this line of diplomacy the actions of President Lee derailed further 
negotiations between the ARATS and the SEF. ROC President Lee visited his alma mater, 
Cornell University on June 9, 1995 provoking the PRC.243 On June 15, ROC Premier Lien 
Chan embarked on visits to Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary244 where he had 
private meetings with his Czech counterpart and with President Vaclav Havel.245 This 
provoked strong protest from China. On June 16, 1995, the ARATS decided in a letter to 
postpone the second Koo-Wang talks due to a “series of actions taken by Taiwan.”246 The 
following day, MAC announced its hope to continue regularized consultation across the 
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Strait, and to hold the preparatory consultation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks as 
planned.247 This hope would be in vain. 
  On June 22, 1995, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, representing the State 
Council, declared Seven Points on Hong Kong-Taiwan relations.248 In this declaration he 
made clear to Hong Kong and Taiwan that the central government in Beijing was in control 
of Hong Kong’s relations with Taiwan. The handling of Hong Kong’s relation with Taiwan 
after 1997 was not part of the autonomous rule of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR); rather, it had to comply with the decision and arrangements made by the 
Beijing government.249 On June 30, the ARATS telephoned the SEF its decision to postpone 
the regularized cross-Strait consultation.250 
Conclusion 
 In this section, Chinese and Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to 
the cooperation of the ARATS and the SEF or high due to the expression of ideological 
divides by politicians higher up each government’s hierarchy. Taiwanese domestic disruption 
grew to medium levels due to increased public support for independence. Chinese military 
disruption was measured at a medium level due to PLA military exercises carried out 
opposite the Island of Taiwan. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was observed at a 
medium level, while U.S. opposition to China grew from a low to high level.  
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JULY 21, 1995 – MARCH 23, 1996 (IVD1 & IntVD1) 
 The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in the period between June 9, 1995 and 
March 23, 1996. Diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan ground to a halt. While the 
ROC publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, the actions of ROC President Lee 
Teng-hui incensed the PRC. The contradictory diplomatic demands of the PRC and ROC 
caused tensions to rise and the United States to seek greater involvement.  
 
Figure 5.2: IVD1 and IntVD1 
 
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 Beginning July 21, 1995 the PRC fired missiles in waters near Taiwan. This 
bombardment lasted for five more days.251  In an attempt to pacify the PRC, President Clinton 
sent PRC President Jiang Zemin a private letter on August 1, promising “no support for 
Taiwan independence.”252 Despite this assurance, or perhaps due to it, the PRC launched 
missiles from August 15 to 25.253 Further provoking the PRC, Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian 
on September 23, said the two sides would move to “one country on each side” after the 
popular direct presidential election.254  
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 The ROC government remained divided on the issue of independence. On January 24, 
1996, ROC Premier Lien Chan reiterated that the ROC government did not wish to see cross-
Strait relations strained at issuing statements and creating publicity. He wanted the two sides 
to open lines of communication and negotiate.255 On January 30, PRC Premier Li Peng made 
a statement that only when Taiwan authorities abandoned creating "two Chinas," or "one 
China, one Taiwan" both in rhetoric and in practice could cross-Strait relations normalize.256  
 In March 1996, President Bill Clinton reacted to Chinese missiles plunging into 
waters just off Taiwan’s coast by dispatching two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the scene. 
This action demonstrated a high level of military opposition to China. Before that, 
government officials, members of congress, and the media had not been paying much 
attention to Taiwan.257 On March 5, the PRC made a statement in the early morning that it 
would launch a military exercise during March 8 through 15, firing ground-to-ground guided 
missiles into waters 20 to 40 nautical miles due east of Keelung, and 30 to 50 nautical miles 
due west of Kaohsiung.258 Lasting from March 8 through 23, Beijing launched the third round 
of missile tests and military exercises on the eve of the ROC presidential election.259 The 
Pentagon confirmed that USS Independence and USS Nimitz had arrived at the Taiwan Strait 
on March 11.260  
 These military threats from the PRC continued through the end of March. Starting on 
March 12, the PRC staged live-fire exercises in a sea and air maneuver off the coastal areas 
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stretching from Xiamen, Fujian Province, to Shantou, Guangdong Province. 261  In the 
following days, the PRC fired more missiles in waters near Kaohsiung harbor,262 dispatched a 
joint force maneuver in the sea near Pingtan, Fujian Province,263 staged a landing exercise on 
a small islet,264 and practiced an air strike exercise.265  Despite all of this intimidation from the 
PRC, on March 23, the citizens of the ROC popularly and directly elected Lee Teng-hui for 
president and Lien Chan for vice president.266  
  
Conclusion 
 In summary, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to the SEF’s desire 
to cooperate, or high due to the rhetoric of President Lee Teng-hui. Chinese diplomatic 
disruption was mostly high, because of both threats to use force and an unwillingness to 
negotiate due to Taiwan’s course of action. Taiwanese domestic disruption grew to high 
levels when President Lee won reelection. Chinese military disruption was measured at 
medium and high levels due to military maneuvers and missile tests being carried out near 
Taiwan’s coast. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan can be observed at a medium level, 
while U.S. opposition to China was measured as high.  
 
MARCH 24, 1996 – JULY 8, 1999 (IVD2 & IntVD2) 
 In the period of time between March 24, 1996 and July 8, 1999, diplomatic relations 
between China and Taiwan continued their complicated trajectory. While the SEF and the 
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ARATS supported negotiation and deeper relations, the executive branches of each 
government wanted unification to be carried out on its own terms. The differences in the 
demands of each political entity caused tensions to rise and the United States to increase their 
diplomatic relations with China and continue arms sales to Taiwan. 
 
Figure 5.3: IVD2 and IntVD2 
 
Questions Over the Use of Force 
 In the wake of the March 23rd elections on Taiwan, the PRC generated a high level of 
diplomatic disruption. On April 23, 1996, Vice Chairman of the PRC Central Military 
Commission reiterated that Taiwan was “an inseparable part of China."267 He insisted on 
"reunification by peaceful means, one country, two systems" and further asserted that the 
PRC would resort to the use of force should Taiwan declare independence or face foreign 
intervention.268 Despite this threat of force, the SEF on Taiwan continued to call for talks. On 
April 29, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS suggesting the resumption of the Koo-Wang 
Talks and regularized consultation.269 The PRC, displeased with Taiwan’s conduct, refused 
this request in a letter on May 2.270 A few days later, MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh said it 
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was the PRC that erected barriers against the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations. Since 
the ARATS replied negatively regarding the resumption of negotiations, the government 
would not seek other ways to express its willingness.271 
 The newly reelected President Lee called for peace, but continued to press the 
contentious issues that triggered the PRC’s aggression. On May 20, 1996, in his inaugural 
speech, President Lee noted the developments related to cross-Strait relations. First, the two 
sides should agree on how to eradicate the hostility in their relationship. Second, both should 
note the reality that the two belong to separate jurisdictions and accept the common goal of 
national unification. Both should strive to foster a system in which “Chinese help 
Chinese.”272 In the days following, Mainland Xinhua News Agency published an article titled 
“The one-China principle is inevitable,” criticizing ROC President Lee's failure to mention 
“one China” in his inaugural speech.273 
 PRC President Jiang Zemin also called for normalized relations while pushing his 
own agenda. Giving an interview to the media while visiting in Spain on June 26, 1996, Jiang 
said that the two sides could enter into cross-Strait negotiations for peaceful reunification and 
follow the principle of “one China” to terminate the hostility between the two sides. Asked to 
comment on a meeting between leaders of the two sides, Jiang said he would welcome the 
Taiwan leader to visit the Mainland in an appropriate capacity.274 Diplomatic tensions 
continued to rise when the PRC issued a thinly veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against 
Taiwan. On August 5, Sha Zukang, PRC representative for negotiations on nuclear weapons, 
told the American media that the PRC had given an unconditional commitment on no-first-
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use of nuclear weapons on any foreign countries including the United States. Taiwan was just 
one province of China, not a country. Therefore, the PRC's commitment did not apply to 
Taiwan.275  
 
International Recognition of Taiwan 
 Even as Taiwan sought peace with the Mainland, domestic decisions disrupted the 
status quo. The National Development Conference was held in Taipei among the KMT, DPP, 
and New Party from December 23 to 28. One major development was that the DPP joined 
the KMT in support of President Lee’s policy of seeking to enhance Taiwan’s separate 
diplomatic standing by winning international recognition.276  
 In early 1997, Taiwanese diplomats and statesmen continued to express their interest 
in a more interdependent and peaceful cross-Strait relationship. In a January seminar, 
“Retrospect and Prospects for Ten Years of Cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges,” MAC 
Chairman Chang King-yuh urged the governments and peoples of the two sides to work for 
greater exchanges of information, culture, and value systems—the three cultural links—in 
order to end the grudges harbored by the two sides.277 While the level of Taiwanese 
diplomatic disruption was low, Chinese diplomatic disruption continued at high levels. On 
March 9, The Fifteenth National People’s Congress adopted the “National Defense Law,” 
which defined the basic principles of and operations for national defense.278 This showed that 
the PRC desired to dispel international worries about the “China threat.” PRC Defense 
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Minister Chi Haotian said that this law could guard against the Taiwan independence 
movement and other secessionist movements that called for splitting the nation.279 
 Taiwanese diplomatic disruption swung from low levels, when leaders called for 
negotiation, to high levels when they condemned the actions of China in Hong Kong or made 
bids for increased international recognition and status. On March 13, 1997, ROC Premier 
Lien Chan said the government would not reject direct cross-Strait talks, but was concerned 
with how the two sides would meet, and whether the two would meet as equals.280 ROC 
Minister of Foreign Affairs John Chang, while delivering a speech in European Parliament's 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defense Policy in Brussels on May 22, 
indicated that Taiwan was a political entity and that the world should confront this reality. He 
called for international support for Taiwan to have an appropriate international status.281 The 
following day, the Government Information Office, under the Executive Yuan, issued a 
position paper on U.S.-ROC Relations and pragmatic foreign policy to explain the 
government's fundamental position. The paper emphasized that the ROC deserved the rights 
of a sovereign state, and called for international attention to the ROC's sovereign status. It 
also noted that the government strongly opposed “one country, two systems.”282 In early June, 
when interviewed by the Washington Times, President Lee said, that the ROC government 
hoped Hong Kong continued to prosper after the reversion of its sovereignty and that 
Taiwan-Hong Kong relations and cooperation could be enhanced. The ROC, however, 
opposed solving the unification of China in the Hong Kong model.283 
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 Taiwan would unify on its own terms, or not at all. On July 18, 1997, MAC Chairman 
Chang King-yuh, explained the four prerequisites for unification: (1) Mainland China had to 
respect the reality that the ROC does exist; (2) Taiwan security would have to be guaranteed; 
(3) two sides could co-exist in international organizations; and (4) Mainland China had to 
renounce the use of force against Taiwan.284 In response, at the 70th anniversary of the 
founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on August 1, PRC Defense Minister Chi 
Haotian said, “The PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the 
Taiwan independence movement, movement to split the mother land, and intervention by 
foreign forces.”285 
 Taiwan called on China’s pragmatism to set aside their differences and cooperate, 
insinuating that China was acting irrationally. On August 8, 1997, MAC Vice Chairman Kao 
Koong-lian said Mainland China should face the reality of the cross-Strait relations with a 
pragmatic attitude. If the PRC could consider adding the words that “Taiwan and the 
Mainland make up China” to further define the “one China Principle,” the ROC government 
would be willing to accept this.286 On September 1, President Lee reiterated that, to extend 
the olive branch, he would be willing to take with him the consensus and will of Taiwan’s 
21.3 million people to visit the Mainland. He was also willing to meet with the top leadership 
of Mainland China for a direct exchange of views and open up a new epoch of cross-Strait 
cooperation.287  That same day, new Premier Vincent Siew spoke on his view of the 
development of cross-Strait relations. He said the two sides should (1) shelve the disputes 
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over sovereignty; (2) promote pragmatic exchanges; (3) proceed with negotiations on an 
equal footing; (4) carry out friendly interaction; and (5) establish a normal relationship.288 
 
The Road to Reestablishing Stable Relations  
 As tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued to subside, the United States chose to 
deepen its ties with China. On October 26, 1997, PRC President Jiang visited Washington, to 
forge a “constructive strategic partnership” with the United States.289 Commenting on cross-
Strait relations after the first summit between President Clinton and President Jiang, the 
MAC urged Mainland China to face the reality that the two sides belong to separate 
jurisdictions, and to immediately resume the Koo-Wang talks and other institutionalized 
channels with no prerequisites.290 On October 31, James P. Rubin, spokesman of U.S. State 
Department, mentioned, for the first time publicly, that the United States would “not 
[support] Taiwan independence.”291  
 The ARATS and the SEF were off to a rocky start in November 1997. On November 
6, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF, inviting Secretary General Jen-ho Chiao to lead the 
delegation of SEF board of directors to attend a conference on economic and trade issues, 
and to tour Mainland cities.292 The next day, the SEF suggested that Chairman Koo lead a 
delegation for a formal visit to meet with relevant persons, and that the ARATS was 
welcome to visit Taiwan.293 Following this redirection, on November 11, an ARATS press 
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release expressed regret that the SEF rejected the November 6 letter of invitation without 
responding to the ARATS’ suggestion.294 This news release said SEF Secretary-General 
Chiao Jen-ho was unable to attend the opening ceremony of the seminar or visit the 
Mainland, thus losing the opportunity for responsible persons of the two associations to meet. 
The ARATS later announced that the seminar was called off without giving any 
explanation.295 In December, Taiwan began to seek talks with China without conditions. In an 
interview with Sankei Shimbun of Japan, President Lee Teng-hui said that the ROC 
government was willing to resume the SEF-ARATS negotiations without any 
preconditions.296 
 Relations between China and Taiwan finally began to normalize in 1998. On January 
1, ROC Premier Vincent Siew reiterated that the cross-Strait discussions should resume, and 
advance step by step. He suggested that the SEF-ARATS functional negotiations should be 
resumed first, and when contacts between the two sides normalized, they would not exclude 
the possibility of entering into talks on other issues.297 On February 20, Taipei agreed to hold 
political talks with Beijing.298 ROC Premier Siew reiterated Taipei’s consistent position on 
resumption of cross-Strait exchanges and consultation in his report to the Legislature.299 
China finally responded in kind on February 24, when the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF 
expressing its willingness to resume cross-Strait consultation and to arrange exchanges 
between the SEF and ARATS.300 On March 5, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS welcoming 
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the February 24 letter of response and indicating the intention to send appropriate members 
of the SEF to the Mainland.301 Following this exchange, the SEF made plans to send 
members to the Mainland by mid-April. 
 Diplomatic disruption was low due to increased communications between the SEF 
and ARATS in March 1998. The ARATS and SEF exchanged letters with plans to resume 
formal face-to-face relations. As promised, in mid-April 1998, SEF Deputy Secretary-general 
Jan Jyh-horng led a delegation visiting Beijing.302 This meeting opened the doors for further 
exchanges. In May 1998, the SEF suggested that the ARATS deputy secretary-general visit 
Taipei during late May.303 On June 1, the ARATS replied that it would choose an appropriate 
theme for the next trip by ARATS deputy secretary-general to Taiwan at an appropriate time. 
The ARATS also expressed that during this trip the ARATS deputy secretary-general would 
take the opportunity to discuss Chairman Koo’s visiting the Mainland with the SEF.304 On 
June 25, the ARATS agreed that SEF Chairman Koo would visit the Mainland in mid-
September or mid-October of that year. The ARATS also expressed that it would designate 
its deputy secretary-general to lead an education delegation to Taiwan in late July, but 
postponed the visit to the Mainland by SEF Deputy Secretary-General Jan, which was 
proposed in the SEF’s letter of June 19. This letter was thus an indirect refusal of SEF Vice 
Chairman Shi's proposed visit.305  
 In Late June 1998, the United States increased its involvement with the PRC, 
indirectly opposing the actions of the ROC. U.S. President Bill Clinton flew from Andrews 
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Airbase in Washington for a nine-day visit to the PRC, and stopped in five Mainland cities.306 
On June 27, during the president’s visit, Jiang Zemin told Clinton in Beijing: “I hope the U.S. 
Government will clearly indicate its support for China’s reunification.”307 In Shanghai, 
Clinton participated in a round table seminar on "Constructing China for the 21st Century." 
He talked about the “three nos policy” on Taiwan—no support for Taiwan's independence, 
no support for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and no support for Taiwan to enter 
international organizations that require statehood.308 He reiterated the U.S. position in favor 
of a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait issues.309 
 
Continued Sources of Instability 
 Even as the SEF-ARATS exchanges fostered stability across the Strait, ROC 
President Lee stayed true to his principles and in the process, disrupted the fragile relations. 
On July 22, 1998, ROC President Lee proposed “democratic unification” at the National 
Unification Council meeting, urging the two sides to negotiate and reach a peace treaty under 
the principle that China had separate jurisdictions.310  Within the next few days, ARATS 
Deputy Secretary-general Li Ya-fei led the promised “Delegation of Beijing City Elementary 
and Middle Schools for Off-Campus Visit Programs” to visit Taiwan.311 
 Tensions escalated again as the PRC refused to renounce the use of force against 
Taiwan. On July 27, 1998, the Information Office of the State Council issued a PRC Defense 
White Paper. In reference to cross-Strait relations, the white paper said that the PRC would 
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not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. It emphasized that each sovereign state had the 
right to adopt any means necessary, including military force, to safeguard the integrity of its 
sovereignty and territory.312 In August, President Lee created a task force for “reinforcing the 
position of the ROC as a sovereign nation.”313  
 Even as tensions rose among top leaders, the SEF, the ARATS, and the MAC 
continued to push for increased exchanges and interdependence. On August 12, 1998, MAC 
Chairman Chang said that cross-Strait negotiations should start with practical issues first and 
later move to political ones. He urged Mainland authorities to stop excessive political 
obstruction of cross-Strait exchanges. Chang also promoted the “new three direct links”—
exchanges of information, culture, and thoughts.314 The SEF and ARATS continued to plan 
for more face-to-face talks. In September, the ARATS invited Liang Su-long, president of the 
Peaceful Reunification Promotion Association Across the Taiwan Strait, to lead a delegation 
to visit Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities in Northeast China.315 During Liang Su-long’s 
visit, Wang expressed his hope to see “a resumption of negotiations and peaceful 
unification.”316 
 As the Clinton Administration sought to increase ties with the PRC, the U.S. 
Congress continued to push for the protection of Taiwan. On September 24, 1998, the U.S. 
House of Representatives adopted the Defense Authorization Act, empowering the 
Department of Defense to study the establishment of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) that 
would cover the Asia-Pacific region to protect Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other 
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allies.317 In the following days, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan arrived in 
Washington for a three-day visit. On September 29, Tang met U.S. President Bill Clinton and 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright separately. At meetings, Tang said he hoped the 
Taiwan issue would not affect the U.S.-PRC relationship. Tang also ruled out the possibility 
that ROC President Lee visit the Mainland in his capacity as president.318 On the first of 
October, the U.S. Senate adopted the joint report on Defense Authorization Act, with 
stipulations that the Department of Defense should complete the feasibility study of a TMD 
within a specific time and include U.S. allies—Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea—under the 
shield.319 
 In mid-October 1998, SEF Chairman Koo traveled to the Mainland. 320  On October 
14, while meeting with Chairman Koo at the Peace Hotel, Chairman Wang said that the two 
sides should promptly enter into political talks and related procedural meetings for them. He 
repeated the substance of the “one China” principle.321 During the second meeting between 
SEF Chairman Koo and ARATS Chairman Wang at the Qinjiang Hotel in Shanghai, the two 
reached four agreements: (1) enhance the dialogue to resume systematic discussions; (2) 
promote exchanges of visits between SEF-ARATS staff at various levels; (3) actively 
provide mutual assistance on cases arising from exchanges; and (4) arrange a Taiwan visit for 
Mr. Wang at an appropriate time.322 On October 18, several SEF delegates met with Jiang 
Zemin. During the meeting, Chairman Koo mentioned Taiwan's achievements in political 
democratization and economic development and added that Taiwan would be willing to share 
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its experiences with Mainland China. Chairman Koo emphasized that Mainland China's 
democratization was the key to reunification. Having a meeting between top leaders of the 
two sides could help find a mutually acceptable way to approach the topic of eventual 
unification.323 
 The PRC and ROC continued to argue over the ROC’s bids for international 
diplomatic status, the “one China” issue, and democratization of the PRC as a precondition 
for unification. On October 30, 1998, regarding Mainland China’s continuing pressure on the 
ROC’s diplomatic space, Premier Vincent Siew said that depriving Taiwan of its 
international space and diplomatic status was an attempt to suffocate the ROC, which was by 
no means acceptable.324 On November 6, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen said that after 
Macau reverts to Chinese rule, the Taiwan side may continue its presence in Macau, but 
would be required to strictly observe the “one China” principle.325 In the following days, in an 
interview with Asahi Shimbun of Japan, PRC President Jiang Zemin mentioned that only 
under the principle of “one China,” the two sides could touch on the post-unification issues 
such as the nation’s name, national flag and anthem.326 
 Even as these divisive issues arose, on November 2, the Executive Yuan held the 
1998 Mainland Affairs Working Meeting in Taipei to conduct extensive discussions under 
the theme of “Unfolding a New Era and Promoting Friendly Interaction” between the two 
sides.327  
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New Deadlock 
 The deadlock of steady tension seemed to settle into place in December 1998. On 
December 11, at the National Assembly general session on national affairs, President Lee 
criticized Mainland China’s bullying of the ROC in the international community as 
“hegemony.” Such a move demonstrated the PRC’s lack of ethnic compassion and its 
violation of the prevalent principles of peaceful co-existence and equal treatment in the 
global village. He vowed to promote pragmatic diplomacy and urged Taiwanese people to 
join together to support the government’s reforms to greet the advent of the new century and 
create a second Taiwan miracle.328 On December 16, MAC Vice Chairman Lin Chong-pin 
emphasized that the ROC government's insistence that the Mainland's democratization must 
take place prior to unification was out of four considerations: regional stability, humanitarian 
considerations, legal considerations, and domestic reality.329 The following day, the Xinhua 
News Agency and China News Service carried the same article, titled “The German Model is 
not suitable for Chinese Unification.”330 President Lee continued to advocate that the ROC 
should not give up fighting for a role in the international community.  
 The ARATS-SEF talks were slow to start. On December 25, 1998, ARATS Vice 
Chairman Tang Shubei said that Chairman Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan should be 
arranged at a time when cross-Strait political and economic dialogue could make progress. In 
the following week, the ARATS held a seminar on cross-Strait relations in Beijing to fully 
understand the ROC’s political developments and to solicit opinions of Taiwanese 
representatives on the development of cross-Strait relations.331  
                                                
328 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv. 
329 Ibid., p. xv. 
330 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC. 
331 Ibid. 
 107 
 Unification began to look increasingly unlikely. On December 31, MAC Chairman 
Chang King-yuh reiterated that Mainland authorities should seriously consider cooperation 
proposals from the ROC government, including the establishment of a military confidence-
building mechanism, joint efforts in the East-Asian financial crisis, assistance in the reform 
of Mainland state enterprises, and exchange of democratic experiences at the grassroots level. 
These programs could have helped the two sides to create a constructive cross-Strait 
relationship of prosperity and reciprocity.332 The PRC was also not willing to compromise. 
That same day, PRC President Jiang Zemin, in a New Year message, repeated calls for 
“peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems” to resolve the Taiwan issue. He hoped 
Taiwan could enter into dialogues and negotiations with the PRC as early as possible.333 
 
Rise of Military Tension 
 In January 1999, China-Taiwan relations progressed from deadlock to high tensions 
once more.  On January 11, Wen Hui Bao of Hong Kong, quoting a Beijing authoritative 
source, said that if the United States included Taiwan in their Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) system, the PRC would be “forced to make proper military adjustments to safeguard 
the integrity of national sovereignty and territory.”334 In early February, Mainland China had 
deployed approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan along the southeastern coast. MAC 
Chairman Su Chi responded, stating that for defense purposes, the ROC government was 
considering joining the TMD of the United States.335 
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 While relations worsened between the PRC and ROC, the United States strengthened 
ties with the Mainland. In April 1999, PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paid an official visit 
to the United States at the request of President Clinton.336 At the joint press conference after 
the Clinton-Zhu meeting, Zhu stated that post-1997 Hong Kong development exemplified the 
PRC’s strict adherence to “one country, two systems.” Conditions for unification with 
Taiwan could be more relaxed, meaning that Taiwan could keep its own military forces and 
the Taiwan leader could serve as deputy leader at the central government level. As for cross-
Strait unification, the PRC repeated its position that it would reach unification through 
peaceful means, but would never renounce the use of force against Taiwan.337  
 From the end of April and into June 1999 diplomatic disruption grew from low to 
high levels. On April 20, Chen Shui-bian argued that Taiwan and China should develop 
“international special relations,”338 evidence of low-level disruption in the form of opening 
negotiations. In early May the PRC tried to block the ROC from entering the World Health 
Organization (WHO) since membership is only for sovereign states.339  From this medium 
level disruptive action, diplomatic tension continued to rise. On May 25, the U.S. House of 
Representatives released the “Cox Report,” which disclosed that the PRC had stolen U.S. 
thermonuclear weapons-related secrets.340 In the following days, the PRC ambassador to the 
United States refused to give a direct reply to the question whether the PRC would use 
nuclear weapons against Taiwan. He claimed that it was a domestic affair to deploy nuclear 
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weapons on the Mainland, in which no foreigner had a say.341  During the month of May, the 
Two-State Theory, which defined “one China” as two equal countries, was finalized and 
submitted to President Lee.342  
 The PRC called for a change in U.S. involvement in the situation. The spokesperson 
of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the PRC strongly opposed the “Taiwan 
Security Enhancement Act,” which was pending in the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives. The Clinton administration publicly expressed its objection to the bill and 
took effective measures to prevent it from being adopted as per PRC demands.343 The next 
day, the vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission stated that selling a TMD 
system to Taiwan, including it in the program in any form, or directly or indirectly bringing 
Taiwan under the umbrella of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation would constitute a serious 
intrusion into the PRC’s sovereignty and territory.344  
 
Conclusion 
 In this period of time between the two peaks of positive feedback, the level of 
disruption decreases as I expected. U.S. diplomatic and military opposition also increased in 
a predictable fashion. As Taiwan sought more power in the international system, the United 
States undermined their claim of sovereignty by backing the PRC. The next section details 
the events of the Taiwan Confrontation. 
 
                                                
341 “Chronology 1999,” MAC. 
342 Sheng Lijun, Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian, (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2002), 
pp. 11-39. 
343 “Chronology 1999,” MAC. 
344 Ibid. 
 110 
JULY 9, 1999-MAY 29, 2000 (IVD3 & IntVD3) 
 The time from July 9, 1999 to May 29, 2000 includes the Taiwan Confrontation. 
ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s insistence on his Two-State Theory incited Chinese 
aggression. Chinese military disruption during this incident only reached medium levels; no 
shots were fired at Taiwan. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption remained high until President 
Chen Shui-bian was elected in May of 2000 and reversed Lee Teng-hui’s incendiary rhetoric. 
 
Figure 5.4: IVD3 and IntVD3 
 
 
 
Two-State Theory 
 July 1999 began with President Lee’s highly disruptive proposal of a “special state-
to-state relationship”345 between China and Taiwan. On July 9, 1999, President Lee said in an 
interview:  
The Republic of China has been a sovereign state since it was founded in 
1912. Moreover, in 1991, amendments to the Constitution designated cross-
strait relations as a special state-to-state relationship. Consequently, there is no 
need to declare independence. The resolution of cross-strait issues hinges on 
the issue of different systems. We cannot look at issues related to the two 
sides simply from the perspective of unification or independence. The Chinese 
Mainland’s promise of a “one country, two systems” formula for Hong Kong 
and Macau is irrelevant to Taiwan ... the ROC is a sovereign, independent 
state.346 
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On July 12, ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan said he was surprised at hearing Lee's 
statement of “special state-to-state relationship.” Wang said that the statement would destroy 
the foundation for cross-Strait talks under the “one China” principle.347Chinese military 
disruption escalated in an attempt to coerce President Lee to back down.  On July 16, 
Chinese jet fighters began to fly across the centerline in the Taiwan Strait.348  
 The United States got involved on the side of China using the tool of diplomacy. On 
July 18, 1999, President Clinton had a hotline telephone conversation with the PRC President 
Jiang Zemin, in which Jiang criticizes Lee's statement of the “special state-to-state 
relationship.” He said that the statement was a dangerous step and a serious provocation to 
the “one China” principle that has been recognized by international society. Clinton 
reiterated that Washington's “one China” policy remained unchanged.349 In the following 
days, President Clinton outlined his “three pillars,” which includes “one China” to pacify the 
PRC, “peaceful resolution” to set Taiwan at ease, and “cross-Strait dialogue” to enhance trust 
and reduce tension.350 
 In response to Chinese military disruption, Taiwan mimicked this response and drew 
up preventive strategies and built a system for “early warning, rapid reaction, and joint 
operations.”351 Their first priorities focused on developing capabilities against short-range 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, information warfare, electronic warfare, and submarine 
warfare in order to ensure ROC national security.352 On July 30, 1999, SEF Chairman Koo 
emphasized that the “special state-to-state relationship” was the ROC government’s position 
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made in line with the consensus in 1993 that “One China principle can be subject to the 
interpretation of the two sides respectively.”353 Koo's remarks were faxed to the ARATS right 
away. However, the ARATS sent it back to the SEF in two hours, claiming that Koo's 
remarks “seriously violate the ‘one China’ principle.” 354  The same day, the ARATS 
Chairman called Chairman Koo’s remarks “unbecoming” adding, “the basis for ARATS-SEF 
exchanges and dialogue no longer [existed].”355 
 Even as Taiwan tried to repair the damage to their relationship, China was not 
satisfied and war looked likely once more.  On August 1, 1999, the MAC appealed for a 
return to the “one China, respective interpretations.”356  The next day, the PRC announced a 
test fire of DF-31 ICBM, capable of hitting the continental United States.357 The Ministry of 
National Defense Spokesman stated that Mainland China had test-fired its newly developed 
long-range ballistic missiles on the Mainland, which is aimed at deterring superpowers, and 
not Taiwan.358 That same day, the Xinhua News Agency carried a commentary titled “To stick 
to the Two-State Theory is a betrayal of the Taiwanese people—a follow-up comment on 
Koo Chen-fu’s statements on July 30.”359 
 Despite Chinese retaliation to the ROC’s idea, the MAC, the SEF and top ROC 
leadership continued to press the concept of a “special state-to-state relationship.” On August 
3, 1999, the MAC released the English edition of “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The ROC’s 
Position on the ‘special state-to-state relationship.’” The MAC stated that this English 
position paper would include the basic information for ROC overseas representative offices 
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to explain the government’s stance on cross-Strait relations to international society.360 On 
August 7, President Lee Teng-hui stated that the key resolution of the current tension in the 
Taiwan Strait lies in economic strength, not military struggle. He said that if Taiwan 
continued to promote economic development in a stable manner, the final victory would be 
on its side.361 
 
Chinese Aggression 
 Chinese military disruption continued to escalate. According to wire reports on 
August 9, 1999, the PRC Central Military Commission prepared for major high-tech live-fire 
exercise to be joined with a missile test fire at sea before the end of August, focusing on 
blockading the Taiwan Straits. The exercise would last for about 10 days.362 The next day, 
authoritative resources in Beijing confirmed that the PRC successfully test-fired a new long-
range ground-to-ground guided missile, the DF-31, within the Mainland on August 2, the 
first test-fire of this type.363 
 Understanding that his interpretation of the 1992 Consensus had backfired, President 
Lee ordered the speaker of National Assembly not to incorporate the Two-State Theory into 
the constitution.364 On August 14, 1999, CCP leaders decided that if Taiwan codified the 
Two-State Theory into its Constitution, the PRC would use force against Taiwan. ARATS 
                                                
360 Mainland Affairs Council, “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of China’s Position on the ‘Special 
State-to-State Relationship,’” Executive Yuan, 1 August 1999, http://fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/880803.htm 
(accessed March 16, 2016). 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv. 
 114 
Chairman Wang said that if Lee retracted the Two-State Theory, he would still visit 
Taiwan.365 
 The United States understood the magnitude of the situation after major military 
deployments and maneuvers. On August 18, the PLA staged a massive maneuver with 100 
military vehicles and 2,000 soldiers transported from Guangdong to Fujian Province.366 On 
September 15, in an unprecedented move, the United States opposed Taiwan’s reentry into 
the UN.367  
 
The Jiji Earthquake 
 The game changed on September 21, 1999 when Jiji, in Nantou County, Taiwan was 
hit by a category seven earthquake. This disaster was the second deadliest quake in 
Taiwanese recorded history. That day, PRC President Jiang expressed his concern, and said 
that Beijing was ready to provide all necessary assistance to reduce the damage caused by the 
earthquake.368 In the following days, the ARATS stated that Mainland China was willing to 
make a donation to disaster relief in Taiwan following the Jiji Earthquake, and that they were 
also willing to send experts to Taiwan to assist in disaster relief. SEF Deputy Secretary 
General Jan Jyh-horng responded that the Taiwanese government was grateful for Mainland 
China's offer, and was willing to accept the donation, but that Mainland China would be 
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notified of the government’s decision regarding the offer of material assistance and expert 
personnel, after further evaluation had been undertaken.369 
 The ROC and PRC both closed the year 1999 with statements of their respective 
concerns and priorities. Executive Yuan Premier Vincent Siew reiterated the ROC 
government’s policy towards cross-Strait relations, pointing out that the four main 
foundations for the development of cross-Strait relations were “national security,” “Taiwan 
first,” “a win-win situation for both sides,” and “international relations.” Premier Siew said 
that Taiwan would seek peaceful unification in the long term on the basis of the “special 
state-to-state relationship.”370 PRC President Jiang said that important progress was made in 
the great task of reunification, and that the implementation of the “One Country, Two 
Systems” principle in Hong Kong and Macao had an important demonstration effect with 
regard to solving the Taiwan issue. Jiang stated that the government and people of Mainland 
China were confident in their ability to solve the Taiwan issue at a not too distant date, 
thereby bringing about the complete reunification of China.371 
 
Renewed Tensions 
 On the first of January 2000, President Lee stated that a “special state-to-state” 
relationship would be a more realistic positioning of the present cross-Strait relations. Both 
sides should negotiate as equals, enhance exchanges, seek common ground and resolve 
differences, and strive for a win-win situation.372 In his New Year comments, President Jiang 
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reiterated that both sides of the Strait could discuss any problem under the principle of “one 
China.”373 
 On February 21, 2000, the PRC released a White Paper on “the One China Principle 
and Taiwan Problem,” which listed “three ifs” for the use of force against Taiwan,374 namely, 
if there occurred any major event wherein Taiwan was alienated from China under any name 
or title; if another country launched an attack and conquered Taiwan; and if the Taiwan 
authorities refused indefinitely to peacefully resolve the issue of cross-Strait unification 
through negotiations. In these cases, the Mainland would be forced to take all possible drastic 
measures, including the use of force to preserve the integrity of the Mainland's sovereignty 
and territory, and to accomplish the great task of Chinese unification.375 
 The Taiwan Confrontation was stabilized only with a change of leadership on 
Taiwan. On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were elected the tenth president 
and vice president of the ROC, and proclaimed a desire to negotiate direct links and peace 
accord.376 In the following days, the Legislative Yuan agreed to open “mini-three links”377 
(direct postal, transportation, and commercial links with the Mainland) as a trial run on the 
offshore islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.378  
 Despite Taiwan’s efforts, on March 28, 2000, the Mainland deployed the latest 
Russian-made S-300 missiles near Fuzhou, and deployed more in the following weeks at 
Xiamen and Shantou.379 Even as this was going on, officials of TAO stated that although 
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cross-Strait talks had been cut off, the functions of cross-Strait exchanges, the care of 
Taiwanese businessmen, and the reception of Taiwanese visitors were still under the 
responsibility of the ARATS. Therefore the ARATS would not be scrapped in the short 
term.380  
 On May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu Hsiu-lien were officially sworn 
into office as the 10th president and vice-president of the ROC. The newly elected President 
then delivered his inaugural address entitled “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting 
Era,” and advocates the “Four No's Plus One” policy on cross-Strait relations. Provided that 
the PRC renounced the use of force against Taiwan, President Chen would not (1) declare 
independence, (2) change the national title from “the Republic of China” to “the Republic of 
Taiwan,” (3) include the doctrine of “special state-to-state” relations in the ROC 
Constitution, or (4) promote a referendum on unification or independence.381  
 Neither the United Stats, nor the PRC trusted President Chen to keep his word and 
promote stability in the Strait.  Under his leadership, Taiwan would be steered closer to 
independence than in the time of President Lee. On May 29, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen 
clearly expressed that “Taiwan [was] part of the Republic of China, and that the Republic of 
China [was] an independent and sovereign country.”382 She also emphasized that whether 
Taiwan would re-unite with the Mainland, declare independence, or maintain the status quo, 
the new administration would be open about it.383 
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Conclusion 
 The Taiwan Confrontation of 1999 began as a result of President Lee’s highly 
disruptive diplomatic statements that Taiwan was a sovereign state since 1912. The Mainland 
responded with high-level diplomatic and medium level military disruption. The United 
States was not deeply involved in this incident. The actions of China and Taiwan for the most 
part corrected themselves through the actions of top leadership, and the voters on Taiwan. 
 
MAY 30, 2000 – MAY 30, 2002 (IV2+ & IntV2+) 
 In the span of time between May 30, 2000 and May 30, 2002, Taiwanese diplomatic 
disruption swung from low in the aftermath of the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, to high as 
President Chen increased support for DPP politics, especially in his pro-independence 
rhetoric. Chinese military and diplomatic disruption shifted from low to high in response to 
the statements and actions of President Chen. The United States was only minimally involved 
in the Strait during this time. 
 
Figure 5.5: IV2+ and IntV2+ 
 
 
Increasing Stability 
 China-Taiwan relations in the period following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation were 
tense but stable. Despite political differences, cultural links between the Chinese and 
 119 
Taiwanese people continued to deepen. In June 2000, the Mainland hosted a religious 
pilgrimage in Fujian Province for the Goddess Mazu.  However, the PRC did not make the 
pilgrimage easy for the Taiwanese. Four principles were to be observed by the Taiwanese 
people participating in the religious pilgrimage to the goddess Matsu on the Mainland, 
namely, (1) under the condition of one China, the implementation of direct two-way 
transportation for mutual benefit and reciprocity, and no docking at a third port is allowed; 
(2) cross-Strait routes are special domestic routes, wherein only ships of both sides are 
allowed to operate. If this poses a difficulty for Taiwan, it can rent ships of Mainland 
companies, or even Hong Kong registered vessels, but it cannot rent foreign vessels; (3) ships 
entering ports can either raise flags bearing a mark or the company's logo, or not carry any 
flag at all; and (4) pilgrimage participants intending to visit other sightseeing spots should 
apply for a Taiwanese compatriot certificate before making the trip.384 
 Diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan remained low for the rest of the 
year. On July 13, 2000, ARATS Chairman Wang stated that “there have been adjustments in 
the independence stance of Taiwan’s new leadership; however, there is a need to continue 
observing,” and reiterated that Taiwanese authorities should revert to the consensus in 1992 
wherein each side makes its own interpretation of “one China.”385 “This is the foundation of 
cross-Strait dialogue.”386 In August, the Mainland decided to end the phase wherein the 
statements and actions of Taiwan’s newly-elected President Chen would be closely 
monitored, and started the phase of waging a tit-for-tat struggle in which goodwill was met 
with goodwill and malice with malice.387 In October, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen said 
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that the cross-Strait policy of the administration was centered on the “Spirit of 1992,” hoping 
for both sides of the Strait to strengthen exchanges and put aside differences. Although 
Taiwan had not accepted the Mainland’s version of “One China,” it would not deliberately 
challenge it.388 A few days later, President Chen reiterated that the ROC Government would 
show its utmost sincerity and patience in searching for the “goodwill reconciliation, active 
cooperation, and permanent peace” for both sides of the Strait.389 He called on the leaders of 
both sides of the Strait to revert to the “Spirit of 1992,” put aside mutual differences, and 
resume dialogues and exchanges as soon as possible.390 
 
Another Period of Increased Tension 
 New differences in opinion arose between the two polities, creating renewed but less 
severe tensions across the Strait. On January 12, 2001, President Chen Shui-bian expressed 
that the integration he had in mind was patterned after that of the European Union, in which 
three concepts were involved: sovereignty, freedom, and self-will.391 Later that month, the 
MAC issued three statements in response to Qian Qichen's statement on the 6th anniversary 
of “Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal.” The MAC reiterated its desire to sit down and talk 
with Mainland authorities without setting any preconditions and pre-set positions, and start a 
dialogue on issues that concern both sides.392 In response to President Chen’s January 12 
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remarks, PRC President Jiang Zemin expressed on March 23, that the confederation or 
federal system was not applicable to cross-Strait unification.393 
 Military tensions rose as China once again stockpiled offensive weaponry and 
conducted military exercises. On May 31, 2001, the Mainland prepared to hold large-scale 
military exercises of its ground, air, and naval forces, and strategic missile units at Dongshan 
Island in Fujian Province. Su-27 fighter planes bought from Russia were also to be used at 
the exercises. The large-scale landing exercises would have Taiwan as the imaginary target 
of the attack. The objective was to simulate air domination on the Taiwan Strait.394 
 In the face of this military threat, President Chen chose to introduce the “New Five 
Nos Policy,” on April 27, 2001. The following are his new promises to promote stability in 
the Strait: (1) Weapons purchases from and stopovers in the United States were not to be 
considered provocative to the PRC; (2) The ROC government would not misread the cross-
Strait situation; (3) Taiwan would not be a pawn of any country; (4) Taipei never abandoned 
its sincerity and its efforts to improve cross-Strait relations; and (5) cross-Strait ties were not 
zero-sum. 395  In July, President Chen expressed that the “one country, two systems” 
framework was attempting to make Taiwan similar to the “Hong Kong” model, in which 
certain systems, freedom, and human rights needed the approval of Mainland authorities to 
take effect. This was not acceptable to the majority of the Taiwanese people.396  
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A Lack of U.S. Involvement 
 U.S. involvement in this period was diplomatically and militarily light. On August 28, 
2001, the Washington Times reported that according to the latest intelligence data of the 
United States, the Mainland had deployed M-type short-range ballistic missiles along the 
coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang. The number of these missiles increased from 300 
in April to more than 350. The U.S. reconnaissance satellite at the same time discovered that 
a new M-M missile base was spotted around the Jiangshan area in Zhejiang Province in 
July.397 While Chinese military disruption escalated, so did Taiwanese diplomatic disruption. 
On November 11, 2001, during a meeting with former U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. 
Cohen, President Chen stated that the Mainland believed that the principle of “One China” 
was the “1992 Consensus.” He went on to say that to set the “one China principle as a 
pre-condition for resuming talks [was] a disguised refusal to negotiate. We [went] over every 
document, and there [was] no so-called ‘consensus.’ This has been unilaterally decided by 
the Mainland, and has not gained the approval of Taiwan.”398  
 Taiwan continued to insist that China renounce the use of force in its dealings with 
Taiwan. In his New Year’s Day Message in 2002, President Chen Shui-bian reiterated that 
once the Mainland abandoned the threat of force and respected the people’s choice of free 
will, both sides of the Strait could begin cultural, trade, and economic integration, and 
proceed toward a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.399 Taiwan 
wanted to put the United States at ease. On January 5, in a meeting with the visiting 
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delegation of the “U.S.-China Security Review Commission,” President Chen proposed a 
three-equilibrium scheme, which was to seek political, economic, and military equilibrium in 
cross-Strait relations, and to establish a constructive cooperation, not antagonistic exclusion. 
At the same time, he expressed the hope that the United States could play the role of 
stabilizer, balancer, and moderator in cross-Strait relations, in order to build a platform of 
peaceful contact and dialogue for both sides of the Strait.400 
 In early May 2000, President Chen expressed the need for permanent peace across the 
Strait.  He said that the normalization of cross-Strait relations needed to start from the 
normalization of trade and economic relations. Second, both sides of the Strait should reopen 
talks in order to minimize misunderstandings and misjudgments. Third, the cross-Strait 
“Three-Links” were a road that needed to be taken, and that the “Mini-Three-Links” were the 
first step toward this goal.401 Later that month President Chen expressed that Taiwan was a 
sovereign independent country, and was not part of the PRC. The majority of the Taiwanese 
people rejected the “one country, two systems” and hoped for the maintenance of the status 
quo. Therefore, during his term, he would not declare independence, change the name of the 
country, or hold any public referendum. Chen believed, as long as both sides of the Strait 
disavowed political maneuvering and focused on economic benefits, the issues with regard to 
the “Three-Links” would soon be resolved.402 This uneasy truce became the status quo.  
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Conclusion 
 In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, tensions lessened then 
worsened as President Chen continued to be politically divisive in the fashion of his 
predecessor Lee Teng-hui. The level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption escalated from low 
to medium, reached high, then returned to low. Chinese diplomatic disruption rose from low 
to medium in this period. The United States did not actively participate in the de-escalation 
process in this period.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
MAY 31, 2002 – MAY 30, 2004 (DV2+) 
 Following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, China-Taiwan relations remained 
unstable. Diplomatic conflict was in general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility 
toward one another, but were open to negotiations with a third party. The United States, 
focused on more pressing global events such as the War on Terror, still fulfilled their 
obligation to Taiwan as per the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. However, economic and 
diplomatic relations between the United States and China continued to increase.  
 The level of diplomatic conflict began at level two in this period: within existing 
channels of communication, one or the other actor complicated negotiations. On June 24, 
2002, the TAO Deputy Director and the ARATS Vice Chairman stated that the Mainland 
would carry on the principles of “one China, direct two-way, and reciprocity and mutual 
benefit” in the promotion of cross-Strait “Three-Links.”403 The following day, the TAO 
Director said that as long as the “Three-Links” were referred to as “domestic routes within a 
country,” they would be applicable to air transport and sea transport. The “Three-Links” 
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would commence just as well. Moreover, as long as Taiwan’s DPP retained the Taiwanese 
independence clause in its party platform, it would be impossible for the Mainland to hold 
party-to-party talks with the DPP.404 While negotiations proved difficult, the ARATS and the 
SEF continued to send officials to meet on both the Mainland and on Taiwan. On June 27, 
the Deputy Chairman of ARATS arrived in Taipei as the head of a visiting delegation.405 
 U.S.-China relations were upset on July 12, when the U.S. Department of Defense 
submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China to the 
U.S. Congress.406 Two days later, in response to this report the PRC Foreign Affairs 
Spokesperson revealed that the Mainland was increasing its military deployment against 
Taiwan, and stated that the Mainland had never joined any arms competitions, and hoped that 
the U.S. Government would earnestly abide by the principles of the three Sino-U.S. 
communiqués, and would refrain from sending incorrect signals to the Taiwanese separatist 
forces.407 
 Diplomatic conflict escalated and plateaued at a level three: hostility toward 
negotiation with one another and/or openness to negotiation with a third party. On July 25, 
2002, The MAC issued a statement expressing that the ROC had always hoped that 
cross-Strait relations would develop toward positive interaction. However, the Mainland 
criticized Taiwan's president, which only worsened the cross-Strait relationship.408 In early 
August, in a live video link from the Office of the President, President Chen Shui-bian 
delivered the opening address: 
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Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished, 
marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity… Taiwan is a sovereign 
independent country. Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and China are 
each one country on each side of the strait.409 
 
President Chen went on to complain that the Mainland had not abandoned the use of force 
against Taiwan, and it continued to suppress Taiwan in the international arena. This was a 
great offense to the feelings of the Taiwanese people.410 
 China feared that Taiwan would seek independence following this and other ROC 
statements. On August 15, 2002, the TAO Spokesperson Li Weiyi released his reaction to 
“Chen Shui-bian's Advocacy of Taiwanese Independence,” which expressed that the 
Mainland would firmly and unchangeably oppose the Taiwanese independence groups 
dividing the country and would work for the realization of the unification of the country. The 
Mainland would never allow anybody to take Taiwan away from “China” in any way. It 
warned the “Taiwanese separatist forces” not to incorrectly assess the situation, and to rein in 
the horse in time and stop all separatist activities.411 In September, President Chen called the 
Mainland’s waging of a long-term “ultra-limit war” against Taiwan, basically similar to any 
terrorist attack in nature. The fear and threat caused by the Mainland's deployment of 400 
missiles along the coastal area of the Taiwan Strait had long surpassed the limit of a terrorist 
attack.412 
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 October and November 2002 continued the trend of level three diplomatic conflict. 
The TAO argued that cross-Strait relations were neither international nor state-to-state.413  On 
November 8, the Mainland’s General Secretary Jiang Zemin made his political report titled, 
“Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” at the 16th Communist Party Congress. The section 
on Taiwan policy mentioned for the first time the new three-stage theory of the principle of 
“one China.”414 While China insisted on the “one China” principle, Taiwan demanded 
democratization as a precondition for negotiation. On November 9, President Chen proposed 
“democracy and peace” as a precondition to the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations and 
expressed that the Mainland had waged a long-term “unrestricted war” on Taiwan, and had 
attempted to rapidly destroy Taiwan's political, economic, financial, and military facilities by 
using “Fifth Column” strategies without any warning.415 
 The diplomatic exchange among top leaders may have been contentious, but the SEF 
and ARATS continued to make headway. On December 1, 2002, Dr. Koo Chen-fu, Chairman 
of the Fifth Board of Directors, expressed that both sides must strive to improve relations and 
invited ARATS Chairman Wang to Taiwan to renew talks.416 The PRC continued to seek 
stable relations with the United States by justifying their actions against Taiwan. On 
December 3, PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi said in a speech on “China-U.S. Relations in the 
new century” that the Mainland's deployment of missiles targeted against Taiwan was a 
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matter involving national security, and should be understood and supported by the United 
States.417  
 In response to the PRC buildup of offensive weaponry and military threats, on 
December 9, 2002, the Taiwan’s 2002 Defense White Paper was released. The paper includes 
a long list of objectives including “maintain air superiority and naval dominance,” and, 
“establish an excellent and modernized military force to best perform the concept of 
‘effective deterrence, resolute defense.’”418 Under these guidelines, Taiwan was to rely on 
domestic products for national defense and supplement with foreign products.  
 The level of diplomatic conflict decreased as China and Taiwan shifted focus to 
economic issues. On December 18, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen stated that the 
Government’s future cross-Strait policy would build “a platform of” cross-Strait exchanges, 
and hoped that it would also attract Mainland capital, human resources, and tourists to 
Taiwan, in order to correct the present situation of uni-directional trend.419 In his year-end 
statement, President Chen pointed out that the policies of “richly cultivating Taiwan while 
reaching out to the world” and “proactive liberalization with effective management” could 
produce a win-win situation for both sides of the Strait, and hoped that the authorities of both 
sides would create collective benefits for the interests of Taiwanese businessmen and the 
development of cross-Strait trade and economy through negotiations and dialogue.420  
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New Year, Same Problems 
 In early 2003, the level of diplomatic conflict in the Taiwan Strait swung between one 
and three. In his New Year Day Message, President Chen Shui-bian said that both sides 
needed to establish an “interaction framework for peace and stability,” which could serve as 
a major objective in the present stage to which both sides could strive for together.421 In the 
following days, the Spokesperson of the TAO agreed with President Chen and expressed that 
cross-Strait relations would gain a significant improvement as long as Taiwan's leaders 
considered the interests of the Taiwanese compatriots, sincerely approved of cross-Strait 
direct links and agreed to resume dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of the 
“1992 Consensus” reached by the SEF and ARATS.422 
 In his New Year’s message, Mainland CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao said that in 
the new year, the Mainland would continue to be firm in its stance of “peaceful unification 
and one country, two systems,” and its goal of unification. He reiterated that the PRC 
supported the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of 
the principle of “one China,” the reinforcement of cross-Strait interactions and exchanges, 
the active promotion of cross-Strait direct “Three-Links,” and the firm opposition of any 
separatist movement of “Taiwanese independence” advocates.423 Following this, President 
Chen called for more sincere negotiations and dialogue in order to stabilize the region.424 The 
PRC finally decoupled economic talks from political posturing. On January 15, the PRC Vice 
Premier Qian Qichen indicated that the cross-Strait “Three-Links” were an economic affair, 
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and that negotiations did not need to involve the political significance of “one China,” but 
should be actively promoted based on the principle that “political divergence should not 
affect or interfere with the spirit of cross-Strait economic cooperation.”425 
 Despite this progress in the economic sphere, the PRC and ROC continued to set 
unrealistic preconditions for diplomatic talks. In early March, CPP General Secretary Hu 
Jintao emphasized that so long as Taiwan accepted the principle of “one China” and the 
“1992 Consensus,” negotiations could resume.426 The problem with this statement is that 
when President Lee tried to define what “one China” meant to Taiwan, it led to the 1999 
Taiwan Confrontation. The SEF-ARATS talks continued to be on hold due to the recent 
political conflicts between both sides of the Strait.427  
 
SARS Outbreak 
 The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak began as early as 
November 2002 in Guangdong Province on the Mainland. It spread to Taiwan in March 
2003. Mainland officials offered to assist Taiwan in SARS prevention, but repeatedly took 
advantage of the issue to refer to Taiwan as a province of China. On April 14, the MAC 
issued a statement that Taiwan was not a province of the PRC, and that it did not welcome 
Mainland officials taking advantage of the SARS epidemic to take politically-motivated 
actions.428  
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 China continued to oppose Taiwan in the international arena. In response to Taiwan’s 
bid to enter the World Health Organization (WHO), Zhang Qiyue, the Spokesperson for the 
Mainland's PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry, stated at a press conference on May 15, 2003, that 
as a province of China, Taiwan was neither qualified to join the World Health Organization 
(WHO) nor to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) in an observer capacity.429 
As the SARS epidemic continued, Taiwan responded to China’s offer of aid.  On May 25, the 
SEF politely refused in a formal letter the Mainland’s offer of medical resources, explaining 
that the resources in Taiwan were “sufficient.” The SEF also requested that the ARATS 
positively regard Taiwan’s need to participate in the WHO.430 
 The third party intervention from the United States remained at a level three. The 
United States deepened relations with the PRC through economic and diplomatic means. On 
June 1, 2003, in a meeting at the G8 Summit in France, PRC President Hu Jintao and U.S. 
President George H. W. Bush stated that the Taiwan Issue had all along been the most 
important issue in Sino-U.S. relations. Remaining firm in its guiding principles of “peaceful 
reunification and one country, two systems,” the Chinese Government was willing to exert its 
best effort to fight for the materialization of cross-Strait reunification through peaceful 
means.431  
 Economic and diplomatic relations across the Taiwan Strait began to improve with 
the gradual easing of the SARS epidemic. On June 19, 2003, Zhang Mingqing, the 
Spokesperson for the TAO, said that it hoped that cross-Strait exchanges would return to 
normal as soon as possible following the reduction of the SARS epidemic. The Mainland 
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side would take corresponding measures depending on the actions to be taken by the Taiwan 
side.432 While the PRC used economic incentives as a carrot to entice the ROC toward 
unification, it also continued work on a rather large stick. On June 20, 2003, the Mainland’s 
Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs met for the first time. In that meeting, Hu Jintao 
mentioned the three priority-works concerning Taiwan: stopping U.S. intervention in 
cross-Strait affairs, enhancing cross-Strait exchanges, and strengthening the military to 
counteract unexpected incidents.433 
 
The Road to Referendum 
 Taiwan continued to press the PRC to renounce the use of force. On July 4, 2003, 
President Chen said that if there were to be changes in the status quo, then the decisions 
would be made by the people through a popular vote public referendum. Otherwise, no 
country, government, political party, or individual could change Taiwan's destiny, its future, 
or its present status as an independent entity independent status quo. The President also 
reiterated that as long as the Mainland was willing to abandon the use of force against 
Taiwan during his term, he guaranteed that the “Four Nos Plus One” policy would remain 
unchanged.434 Essentially, President Chen threatened to disrupt the status quo via public 
referendum if the PRC did abandon the threat of conquering Taiwan by military means. In 
October, the President Hu Jintao met with President George W. Bush and said that China 
would never tolerate Taiwan independence.435 
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 In response to Chen’s proposed referendum and new constitution, the Mainland 
Xinhua News Agency released a commentary “exposing Chen Shui-bian's political fraud” in 
November severely attacking President Chen’s real intention of carrying out Taiwanese 
independence under the guise of a public referendum.436 Later that month, the TAO issued the 
first direct threat of force against Taiwan if independence was declared.437 In the following 
days, the Legislative Yuan passed the “Referendum Law,”438 which could potentially be used 
to declare independence from the Mainland. In response, the PRC deployed 496 ballistic 
missiles within a radius of 600 kilometers and carried out military exercises for the purpose 
of attacking Taiwan at any time. President Chen then stated that in order to ensure Taiwan's 
sovereignty and public security, a “defensive referendum” would be held on March 21, 
2004.439 
 On December 5, 2003, President Chen offered China an ultimatum. In a special 
interview with the New York Times, President Chen announced that the topic of the defensive 
referendum was that “the 23 million people of Taiwan [would] firmly demand that the PRC 
immediately withdraw all the ballistic missiles aiming at Taiwan and also openly and 
publicly announce and promise that they [would] not use force against Taiwan.”440 He also 
said that if the leadership in China responded with goodwill and agreed to immediately 
withdraw all the ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and openly announced that they would 
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not use force against Taiwan, then Taiwan would not hold a defensive referendum on March 
20, 2004.441  
 In order to reframe the situation, China targeted Taiwan’s democratic process. On 
December 7, in a meeting with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York, PRC 
Premier Wen Jiabao expressed that Beijing understood the demands of the Taiwanese people 
for democracy. He added that, “however, the separatist forces of the Taiwan administration 
are attempting to split Taiwan away from China under the guise of democracy, which we 
shall not tolerate.” He further emphasized that as long as there was a ray of hope, the Chinese 
government would never abandon using peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue.442 This 
last was supposed to reassure Taiwan that although the PLA had weapons trained on the 
Island, that as long as independence was not declared, force would not be used. 
 In year of 2004, tensions maintained their steady pace. President Chen called for 
peace and pledged his commitment to the “Four Nos Plus One” promise as long as China was 
willing to accept the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.443 Chinese Premier Hu 
Jintao reiterated the Mainland position that Taiwanese independence would be met with 
severe consequences.444  
 
Taiwanese Espionage Case 
 On January 14, 2004, the PRC caught seven Taiwanese as they collected intelligence 
at the Guangzhou Huangpu shipyard. Following President Chen’s public disclosure that he 
                                                
441 Keith Bradsher and Joseph Kahn, “Taiwan Referendum to Focus on Missiles, Not Independence,” New York 
Times, 5 December 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/international/asia/05CND-TAIW.html (accessed 
March 16, 2016). 
442 “Chronology 2003,” MAC. 
443 “Chronology 2004,” Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Republic of China (Taiwan), updated 16 February 
2016, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67764&ctNode=6605&mp=3 (accessed February 16, 2016). 
444 Ibid. 
 135 
was aware of the position of Chinese military bases, and missiles aimed at the island, the 
intelligence network on the Mainland was crushed.445 The ARATS informed the SEF of the 
case against the seven spies. They had confessed everything about their identities and 
espionage activities. Their case was being processed.446  Following this letter on January 16, 
the MAC released a statement on the alleged “Taiwanese Espionage Case” pointing out that 
they had “reasons to suspect that this [was] the Mainland’s intention to influence the 
development of Taiwan's domestic political situation and to manipulate Taiwan’s 
elections.”447 
 President Chen explained the “One Principle and the Four Major Issue Areas” on 
February 2, 2004. The “One Principle” was “Establishing the Principle of Peace.” The “Four 
Major Issue Areas” were, the establishment of a negotiation mechanism, exchanges based on 
equality and reciprocity, the establishment of a political relationship, and the prevention of 
military conflicts. President Chen stressed that after the March 20 presidential election, he 
would invite Mainland China to work towards the initiation of cross-Strait negotiation.448 
 During this time, the United States during tried to be as detached as possible while 
still fulfilling its obligations according to treaties. On March 1, 2004, President Chen 
approved the long-delayed procurement of advanced weaponry from the United States.449 In 
an exclusive interview with the LA Times on March 6, President Chen Shui-bian guaranteed 
that the Taiwan issue would not become a burden on the United States. In the next four years, 
Taiwan would maintain the status quo, and Chen would continue efforts to prevent the status 
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quo from being unilaterally changed.450 On March 20, Chen narrowly won reelection. On 
March 31, in an interview with the BBC, President Chen stated that it was his top priority to 
improve and stabilize cross-Strait relations in the next four years.451 
 The PRC attempted to pit the United States against Taiwan. On April 14, 2004, PRC 
President Hu Jintao during his meeting with U.S. Vice President Cheney stated that the 
greatest threat to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was the Taiwanese separatist 
movement. He also demanded that the United States honor its commitments and oppose 
Taiwan independence and any words or deeds by Taiwan leaders to unilaterally change the 
status quo of Taiwan.452 
 
The Inauguration of President Chen 
 On May 20, 2004 President Chen delivered his inaugural address, “Paving the Way 
for a Sustainable Taiwan.” Regarding Cross-Strait relations, the President emphasized 
goodwill, peace, and development, and reiterated that the principles and his promise made 
during his inaugural address on May 20 in 2000 had not changed over the past four years, nor 
would they change in the next four years.453 Later that month, Hong Kong newspaper 
Takungpao reported that the Mainland’s armed forces would hold joint military exercises at 
Dongshan Island in Fujian in June. It is the first time that the objective of the exercises was 
“to vie for air domination over the Taiwan Strait.”454 On June 7, The Hong Kong Wenweipo 
reported that Mainland authorities have stated that if the United States did not sell advanced 
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weapons to Taiwan, the Mainland would consider withdrawing the ballistic missiles 
deployed along its southeastern coast.455 In reaction to this, on June 16, President Chen stated 
that in facing the growing threats of the Mainland, only by transcending political parties and 
strengthening self-defense capabilities could Taiwan’s military forces be able to effectively 
deter, a possible PRC military venture.456 
 
Conclusion 
 In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, diplomatic conflict was in 
general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility toward one another, but were open 
to negotiations with a third party. The United States was focused on other parts of the world, 
namely the Middle East in President Bush’s War on Terror. Bound by the Taiwan Relations 
Act of 1979, the United States continued to sell defensive systems to Taiwan.  However, 
economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China were only 
deepening. Cross-Strait Relations did not stabilize into the “1992 Consensus” until KMT Ma 
Ying-jeou was elected President in March 2008. 
 
JUNE 9, 1991 – JUNE 8, 1993 (DV2-) 
Introduction 
 In general, China-Taiwan relations in the early 1990s looked promising. Diplomatic 
relations between the two governments improved with the creation of the SEF on Taiwan and 
the ARATS on the Mainland. The United States continued to improve economic relations 
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with the PRC and fulfill its obligations to Taiwan according to the 1979 Taiwan Relations 
Act.  
 
Context of Improved Relations 
 Cross-Strait relations were on a track to improve in 1991. The Executive Yuan 
established the MAC in January, the SEF in February, and drew up the “Guidelines for 
National Reunification in March.457 The guideline stipulated that: (1) The existence of the 
Republic of China was a simple reality that could not be denied; (2) “One China” referred to 
China as a historical, geographical, cultural, and racial entity; and (3) Unification was 
inevitable, but mutual hostilities had to be eradicated. Each had to include one another in the 
international arena and renounce the use of force for unification.458  
 In April 1991, President Lee announced that the Beijing regime would no longer be 
regarded by Taiwan as a rebel organization.459 This demonstrated that the ROC had formally 
renounced military force as a means of national unification. Therefore, military disruption 
was not a very important measure of the independent variable of study during this time. This 
diplomatic gesture also showed that the ROC government would no longer compete for the 
“right to represent China” in the international arena.  
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Relative Peace in the Strait 
 Even in June 1991, China had formulated its position on “peaceful unification; one 
country, two systems.”460 This had not yet become a contentious issue. In 1991, the TAO 
made its first “June 7 Statement,” of which the major element was to suggest to Taiwan: 
“Relevant agencies, delegated bodies, and individuals from both sides of the Strait should, as 
soon as possible, bring discussions to solve the issues of the ‘three links’ and bilateral 
exchanges.” 461  Additionally, it suggested “the Communist Party of China and the 
Kuomintang of China should send representatives to engage in contacts, so as to create 
conditions for the progress of negotiations for a formal end to hostilities and gradual peaceful 
unification.”462 
 Diplomatic relations were improved on both sides through the expansion of economic 
ties. On July 2, 1991, the spokesman of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade introduced the following five principles to promote cross-strait economic and trade 
relations: (1) direct and two-way trade, (2) mutually beneficial relations, (3) many trading 
areas, (4) stable and long-term relations, (5) abiding by agreements.463  
 During this period, the seeds of future problems were sown.  In October 1991, the 
DPP introduced the “Independence Clause” into its party charter. It aimed to establish the 
“Republic of Taiwan” with independent sovereignty, drafting a new constitution, and holding 
referendums.464 This was met with considerable KMT backlash. In November, Taiwan joined 
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the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the name “Chinese Taipei.”465 
China only allowed Taiwan to participate in international organizations and activities as 
“Chinese Taipei,” or a similar title. This generated a high tide of separatist feeling in 
Taiwan.466 In December 1991, China-Taiwan relations continued to improve. On December 
16, the TAO created the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) to 
promote contacts with Taiwan and eventual reunification.467  
 
A New Year of Cooperation 
 January 1992 began an era of communications across the Taiwan Strait through the 
SEF and ARATS. On January 8, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF to invite their chairman, 
the vice chairman, or the secretary-general to lead a delegation to visit Beijing and exchange 
views on enhancing communications and cooperation.468 On June 16, secret envoys agreed to 
hold the first “Koo-Wang talks” in Singapore.469 ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan sent a 
letter on August 4, to invite SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu for a meeting to exchange views on 
economic development and SEF-ARATS affairs and discuss related programs.470 
 On August 8, the National Unification Council (NUC) of the ROC approved the 
resolution on the “Definition of One China,”471 which states, “both sides of the Taiwan Straits 
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agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Straits have different 
opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China.’”472 This became the basis for the 1992 Consensus.  
 U.S. involvement in Taiwan at this point in time was largely arms sales to promote 
the defense of Taiwan.  On September 2, 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced his 
decision to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.473  These sales did not yet hamper China-
Taiwan Relations. Later that month, the “Statutes Governing Relations between People of the 
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” and its by-laws were enacted. These laws were made 
for the purpose of handling legal matters that could arise before national unification.474  
 On September 30, the ARATS suggested to the SEF that they hold a preparatory 
meeting on the Mainland to settle the time, place, and agenda of the planned “Koo-Wang 
Talks.”475 This practical meeting took place in Hong Kong in late October. In November, the 
SEF proposed that each side express its interpretation of “one China” verbally and based its 
own interpretation on the August 8 resolution of the NUC.476  In response, the ARATS “fully 
respected and accepted” SEF’s suggestion to verbally interpret “one China” respectively.477  
 Even as Taiwan improved diplomatic relations with China, it was still negotiating 
arms deals to arm itself against a possible attack. On November 18, Taiwan signed a deal to 
procure 60 Mirage-2000 jet fighters from France.478 In December, the SEF sent a letter to the 
ARATS that emphasized that the top priority of the practical meeting was to solve 
substantive issues. As to the substance of “one China,” the ROC had been consistent in 
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following the Guidelines for National Unification and decisions of the NUC.479  The ROC 
stance was that each side of the Strait was governed by a separate political entity.  When 
China was asked to comment on the ROC position in December, ARATS Vice Chairman 
Tang Shubei said that the PRC’s stance on that issue had been consistent and against the 
statement of “two political entities.”480 Tang said such a statement was not helpful for 
improving cross-Strait relations.481 
 
Complications and Collaboration 
 In the year 1993, U.S.-China relations became complicated, while China-Taiwan 
relations benefited from the collaborative efforts of the SEF and ARATS. On January 21, 
William Jefferson Clinton was inaugurated as the President of the United States.482 The focus 
of his China policy was the renewal of the most favored nation (MFN) treatment. There was 
initial pressure from human rights groups to use trade as leverage to pressure the PRC to 
improve its human rights record moving forward. The Clinton Administration eventually 
decided to delink human rights improvement and trade relations, a major change in U.S. 
policy.483 
 That same day on January 21, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the 
White Paper on ROC Foreign Policy. It stipulated that the ROC’s foreign policy is one-
China, two entities, and equality at the interim. The policy paper said that the government 
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would pursue an international space, with a long-term goal of returning to the UN and the 
eventual goal of China’s unification.484  
 In March 1993, the SEF-ARATS talks continued to move forward. On March 2, the 
SEF suggested to the ARATS that they hold the next round of “Koo-Wang Talks” in late 
March or early April. At the preparatory meeting for the upcoming “Koo-Wang Talks,” 
MAC Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian said that the talks would cover four issues—
SEF-ARATS affairs, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, cultural exchanges, and a 
joint combat against crime. The protection of Taiwanese investment might be added to the 
agenda.485 The talks were held in Singapore from April 27-29. SEF Chairman Koo and 
ARATS Chairman Wang signed four agreements: (1) the Agreement of Document 
Authentication, (2) the Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered 
Mail, (3) the Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and Communication 
Channels between the SEF and ARATS, and (4) the Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.486 
 
Conclusion 
 From 1991 to June 1993 the level of diplomatic conflict was generally low. China and 
Taiwan benefited from economic and legal cooperation of the SEF and ARATS 
organizations. Third party intervention was observed at level four due to U.S arms deals with 
Taiwan, but a level three when the United States deepened economic relations with China. I 
observed military conflict in the Taiwan Strait at level two, when Taiwan continued to 
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stockpile weapons in preparation for a potential Chinese attack. Overall, the level of conflict 
during this period was low.  
 
SUMMARY 
 In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables during five 
periods in order to capture the formation and decline of a positive feedback cycle. I then 
examined the resultant level of conflict in the Taiwan Strait before and after the time 
designated as the positive feedback cycle. I found that the level of conflict was still medium 
to high in the aftermath of the 1999 Confrontation. China-Taiwan relations did not stabilize 
until a pro-unification leader was elected president in Taiwan in 2008.487  
  
                                                
487 Due to the constraints of my methodology, this event was not included in my case study, though it would 
have strengthened my argument and application of the PE Model.   
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CHAPTER SIX: 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for decades persist 
despite periods of extreme tension and change?  How have the foreign policy decisions of 
each state in the system helped to manage the persistent deadlock? To answer these 
questions, I used the punctuated equilibrium (PE) model to explore the positive feedback 
cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and the process by which the negative feedback cycle was 
reinstituted. According to Baumgartner and Jones, a positive feedback mechanism, or 
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs, often as a result of 
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting 
mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to 
create a stable output. I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between 
China and Taiwan were to increase, then the level of negative feedback from the United 
States would increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my hypothesis, I used a 
theory-guided case study approach. Case 1 discussed the First and Second Taiwan Strait 
Crises of the 1950s. Case 2 examined the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan 
Confrontation. My independent variable examined Chinese diplomatic disruption, Taiwanese 
diplomatic disruption, Chinese military disruption, and Taiwanese military disruption. The 
intervening variable of this study included four components: U.S. diplomatic opposition to 
China and to Taiwan, as well as U.S. military opposition to China and to Taiwan. Each case 
study encompassed two crises and formed one positive feedback cycle.  
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 In this chapter I analyze my findings and present conclusions. In the first sections, I 
analyze the independent, intervening, and dependent variables to make lateral comparisons 
across both cases. (Continue when chapter is finished) 
 
ANALYSIS 
 This section draws comparisons between the two case studies. I first analyze the 
independent and intervening variable measures, then compare the results of the dependent 
variable for both cases. I intend to show how the PE Model can help explain deadlock in the 
Taiwan Strait. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The independent variable for study is the level of positive feedback generated 
between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption is the first component of the 
independent variable. Based on the PE Model, I expected the level of Taiwanese diplomatic 
disruption for both cases to increase in the two years prior to the first crisis, peak during the 
first crisis, dip in the interim, peak again during the second crisis, and decrease in the two 
years following.  
 The independent variable measures in Case 1 began September 3, 1952, in the two 
years prior to the first crisis. This case followed a shallow decline in the intensity of 
Taiwanese diplomatic disruption. The level of disruption was highest in the two years leading 
up to the first crisis. As a result of the high tensions across the Taiwan Strait in the aftermath 
of the Chinese Civil War, ROC leader Chiang continued to use highly disruptive rhetoric up 
until the first crisis. For example, once he learned that U.S. President Eisenhower sent the 
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Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait due to the Korean War, Chiang declared that he believed 
Nationalist forces could attack communists on the Mainland at any time without UN sanction 
or fear of Soviet intervention. 488 In the following periods, Chiang was already exchanging 
fire with the Mainland and did not need to threaten to use force. His diplomatic focus shifted 
from threatening to use force against the communists to pressing the United States for a 
mutual defense treaty, resulting in a shift from high to medium diplomatic disruption.  
 
Figure 6.1: Case 2 Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption 
 
 Case 2 measures began June 9, 1993 spanning the two years prior to the first 1990s 
crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was the major component of 
the independent variable for Case 2. The measure began at a low level and oscillated between 
low and high, ending the cycle at a low level. Relations had begun to improve in the early 
1990s when China established the ARATS and Taiwan launched the SEF. These two semi-
governmental organizations opened negotiations, establishing a low level of disruption. 
Meanwhile, top leadership in Taiwan pushed for a greater voice in the international arena, 
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and later threatened independence, creating a high level of disruption. President Lee’s visit to 
Cornell University in the United States was the action that aggravated the PRC and incited 
their use of force. The cycle ended with hopes from both ROC and PRC leaders that the two 
sides could return to the status quo ante.  
 Chinese diplomatic disruption is the second component of the independent variable. 
Based on the PE Model, I expected this measure to create a bimodal curve. Figure 6.2 and 
6.3 show the trends in the Chinese diplomatic disruption data for the two cases. 
 
Figure 6.2: Case 1 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption 
 
 In Case 1, Chinese diplomatic disruption begins at a high level in the two years prior 
to the first crisis, oscillates during the crises, and ends on a high level in the two years 
following the second crisis. The high-level disruption leading up to the first crisis is a product 
of tensions from the Chinese Civil War. During the two years prior and throughout the period 
of study, PRC leadership called for the “liberation” of Taiwan and threatened to use force 
against intervening states. However, once the PRC discovered that the United States was 
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seriously considering using nuclear weapons in the region, it sought to negotiate with the 
Unites States and Taiwan. Due to its alliance with the ROC and its aversion to communism, 
the United States did not want to deepen ties with the PRC. As a result of this spurn, the 
Communist propaganda espoused that the PRC had never been interested in only capturing 
the Offshore Islands, but were determined instead to take the Offshore Islands and Taiwan at 
the same time. Nothing came of this news due to the ceasefire.  
  
Figure 6.3: Case 2 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption 
 
 Chinese diplomatic disruption in Case 2 appears to have a more bimodal structure. In 
the two years prior to the first 1990s crisis, this measure increased from a low to a high level. 
Disruption remained high during the first crisis, dipped to low levels in the brief interim, and 
then reached high levels during the second crisis. While tensions initially deescalated in the 
two years following the crises, the status quo would not be reinstituted until 2008 when 
President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) was elected. Levels started at a low intensity due to the SEF-
ARATS talks. However, due to President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in the United 
States, the SEF-ARATS talks were suspended and PRC leadership stated that they would 
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only negotiate under the “one China” principle. In the interim between crises, Chinese 
diplomatic disruption continued at high levels due to their threats of force against Taiwan. 
The one instance of low diplomatic disruption during this period was the ARATS invitation 
to the SEF to resume talks, yet tensions increased once more to high levels due to the refusal 
of the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. The level of diplomatic disruption 
during the second crisis was high, then decreased to low levels during the de-escalation of the 
1999 Confrontation. 
 Taiwanese military disruption is the third component of the independent variable. 
This measure was more important in Case 1 than in Case 2. According to the PE Model, I 
expected another bimodal curve for this measure. This was loosely accurate in Case 1. 
 
Figure 6.4: Case 1 Taiwanese Military Disruption 
 
 Taiwanese military disruption in Case 1 began at a high level in the aftermath of the 
Chinese Civil War. It decreased to low levels at the end of the first crisis, was high again at 
the start of the second crisis, and decreased to a medium level by the end of the second crisis. 
In the two years prior to the first crisis, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 15,000 
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to Matsu.489 This movement of troops to mount an assault on the Mainland was a clear 
indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. Low-level disruption occurred in the 
interim when Taiwan was not firing on the Mainland, but was stockpiling weapons. The level 
of military disruption did not decrease significantly due to the militaristic leadership of 
Chiang.  
 By contrast in Case 2, Taiwanese military disruption was rather insignificant. Due to 
the fact that the ROC was no longer considered an independent state, they did not have the 
capability nor desire to be highly militarized. They only maintained low-level arms deals 
with the United States during this period, the purpose of which was to ensure Taiwan could 
defend itself under attack. For example, while facing the PRC threat of high-tech weapons 
and forces, the ROC Minister of National Defense expressed that the ROC armed forces 
would draw up preventative strategies and expedite the building of a modern capability for 
“early warning, rapid reaction, and joint operations.” 490 This amounted to a low level of 
Taiwanese military disruption for the entire period. 
 Chinese military disruption is the fourth component of the independent variable. 
According to the PE Model, I expected to see another bimodal curve in the data. Case 1 and 2 
loosely follow this trend.  
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Figure 6.5: Case 1 Chinese Military Disruption 
 
 As shown in figure 6.5, Chinese military disruption began at a high level during the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis. After Chiang Kai-shek ordered thousands of troops to Quemoy and 
Matsu, the Chinese Communists began artillery bombardment of the islands. When the first 
ceasefire was declared, disruption fell to a low level. In the time between the two crises, the 
PRC—in response to U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons—signed a secret agreement with the 
Soviet Union to develop nuclear capability. 491 During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
Chinese diplomatic disruption rose to a high level and fell to a low level again when the PRC 
declared the second ceasefire. A brief confrontation between a U.S. ship in PRC waters and 
the PLA resulted in a brief high level of disruption in the Taiwan Strait, but once the 
ceasefire was reinstituted, tensions dropped down to low levels. 
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Figure 6.6: Case 2 Chinese Military Disruption 
 
 Chinese military disruption in Case 2 more closely resembled a bimodal curve than in 
Case 1. In the two years before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC staged military 
exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province resulting in a medium level of disruption.  
During the crisis, China launched missiles into Taiwanese waters creating a high level of 
disruption, while also conducting threatening joint military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In 
the time between incidents, China has approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan in 
response to ROC consideration of joining the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system of the 
United States. The level of military disruption peaked again during the 1999 Confrontation 
when Chinese jet fighters pressed the centerline in the Taiwan Strait. Disruption fell to 
medium levels when the PRC was only pointing missiles at Taiwan toward the end of the 
confrontation.  In the two years following the Taiwan Confrontation, military disruption fell 
to low levels as the PRC stopped aiming missiles at Taiwan but continued to stockpile 
weapons in the area. 
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Conclusion 
 The independent variable is divided into four parts because each case began and 
continued for different reasons. Some measures are more important than others. In Case 1, 
both Chinese and Taiwanese military disruption were important measures, while in Case 2, 
Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was most significant. Case 1 did not seem to follow my 
predictions based on the PE Model due to the close chronological proximity to the Chinese 
Civil War. 
 
INTERVENING VARIABLE 
 The intervening variable of study is the level of negative feedback from the United 
States in response to the disruptive actions of the PRC and ROC. According to the PE Model, 
I expect to see varying degrees of response to Chinese and Taiwanese disruption. This will 
depend on the relationship of the United States with each political entity in two very different 
time periods.  
 U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan is the first element of the intervening variable. 
In Case 1 the United States and the ROC on Taiwan are formal allies. The United States 
considered the ROC to be the legitimate government of Greater China. This was in large part 
due to the fear of Communism in the United States, and a result of political realities at the 
conclusion of the Second World War. Due to their relationship as allies, U.S. diplomatic 
opposition to Taiwan only reached medium levels. For example during the first crisis, the 
United States was reluctant to sign a mutual defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. In the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States tried to improve relations with the PRC in the 
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Warsaw Talks, resulting in a medium level of opposition to Taiwan. This trend of improving 
Sino-American relations would continue.  
 U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1990s had changed from the 1950s. The ROC was no 
longer considered the legitimate government of China. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan 
in Case 2 was generally observed at medium levels as a result of the improvement of the 
U.S.-PRC relationship through diplomacy and growing economic interdependency. 
Additionally, the reluctance of the United States to support Taiwan, illustrated by President 
Clinton’s “Three Nos Policy,” also shows medium level opposition. 
 The second element of the intervening variable is U.S. diplomatic opposition to 
China. In Case 1, during the two years prior to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, U.S. 
diplomatic opposition to Taiwan fluctuated between low and medium levels: low when the 
United States publicly condemned China’s actions or supported Taiwan’s and medium when 
the United States threatened to declare war against the Mainland and send forces in to 
stabilize the region. Opposition to China peaked during the first crisis with the creation of the 
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The high level opposition fell to medium 
levels for the rest of the period due to U.S. threats to go to war against China.  
 In Case 2, the United States and China are much more economically interdependent, 
which changes the type and magnitude of U.S. opposition. U.S. criticism of China’s 
oppressive government and human rights record resulted in a low level of opposition. 
Diplomatic opposition rose to medium levels due to U.S. arms deals with Taiwan and the 
1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. opposition to China increased to high levels when the U.S. 
Congress agreed to issue Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University in 
the United States. This was against the wishes of the Clinton Administration. 
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 The third element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to Taiwan. In 
Case 1, the Nationalist Government on Taiwan was an ally of the United States against 
communism. During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States ordered the Seventh 
Fleet into the Taiwan resulting in a high level of military opposition. This measure was not 
only designed to censure China, but also constrain Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of the nature 
of the U.S.-ROC relationship, the United States did not militarily oppose any actions taken 
by the Nationalists. In the 1990s this measure was similarly insignificant, but for separate 
reasons.  
 The political landscape had changed in the period of détente between the first two 
crises in the 1950s and the third crisis in the 1990s. Taiwan, officially considered by the 
United States to be a province of China, was not subject to direct military opposition. The 
PRC would consider any attack on Taiwan to be an attack on the “Motherland.” The United 
States would not jeopardize its relationship with either of the two political entities in such a 
way.  
 The fourth element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to China. In 
Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was constantly at a high level due to the naval 
forces, equipment, intelligence, and air support given to the ROC. U.S. military opposition to 
China in Case 2 was high due to U.S. naval and air support, equipment, and intelligence 
given to he ROC through arms deals.  
 The intervening variable of study is the negative feedback, or equilibrium forces 
provided by the United States. Each of the four elements that create this variable measure is 
important in the context of various events. For example, due to the amicable relationship with 
the ROC on Taiwan, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was the only logical option. 
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Military opposition would have destroyed their relationship. The next section analyzes the 
dependent variable. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict in the region. I 
hypothesized that if China or Taiwan were to increase their disruptive forces, then the United 
States would increase its influence, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Conversely, if China 
and Taiwan increased their disruptive actions, then the United States did not intervene, the 
resultant level of conflict would still be high. 
 The first part of the dependent variable is the level of diplomatic conflict. From two 
years to four years after Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, diplomatic conflict was at a level three. 
The PRC would not directly communicate with the ROC and vise versa. However, the PRC 
was willing to negotiate with the United States. In order to set a base line to compare the 
status quo ante and the current level of conflict, I measured the dependent variable in the four 
years to two years prior to the first crises in each case. The aftermath of the Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis was very similar to the status quo ante. In the years before the independent and 
intervening variables, the PRC would not communicate or negotiate with the ROC on Taiwan 
resulting in a level three. 
 From two years to four years after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, the level of 
diplomatic conflict was mostly observed at a level two, with a few level one incidents.  For 
instance, during the “Taiwanese Espionage Case,” the MAC complicated preexisting 
communication networks, first by sending in spies in the first place, and second by being 
uncooperative to negotiations with China. This element of the variable fell to low levels only 
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when Taiwanese leaders espoused their desire to meet for talks. Diplomatic conflict was 
observed at level one in the Taiwan Strait during the time before the Third Taiwan Strait 
Crisis and 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. During this period Taiwan had just established SEF 
and China created ARATS. These two semi-nongovernmental organizations helped get the 
ball rolling towards unification and greater cooperation. 
 The level of military conflict is the second piece of the dependent variable. In the 
aftermath of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level three. This was 
largely due to the militarism of Chiang Kai-shek.  For example in the spring of 1961, Chang 
sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. However, U.S. refusal to supply the 
shells shut down this plan. In the years before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of 
military conflict in the region was observed at a level two.  PRC Premier Zhou En-lai 
threatened to use force against the United States in Korea.   
 In the years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, military conflict in the region 
was at a level three. The PRC was increasing its military deployment against Taiwan in 2002. 
By November 30, 2003, the PRC had deployed 496 ballistic missiles within a radius of 600 
kilometers.492 Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level two.  The 
ROC continued to sign arms deals with not only the United States, but also with other 
countries in the international arena, such as France. 
 The third piece of the dependent variable is the level of third party involvement (TPI). 
In Case 1 after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of TPI escalated from level two to 
level four. One example of a level four conflict was President Kennedy’s press conference in 
which he said that the United States would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. Before 
the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI swung between level one and level three. Level one 
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occurred when the United States extricated itself from the cross-Strait relationship in order 
not to damage its relationship with China.  
 In Case 2 after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, TPI reached level three when the 
Department of Defense submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC to the 
U.S. Congress. 493 Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, President H. W. Bush decided to sell 
150 jet fighters to Taiwan;494 as a result, TPI was observed at level four.  
 The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict before and after the 
crises in each case. The three parts that make up this variable measure are the level of 
diplomatic conflict, the level of military conflict, and the level of third party involvement. In 
Case 1, the level of diplomatic conflict was the same before and after at a level three. 
Military conflict was observed at a level two before the conflict, and at a level three after.  
Third party involvement before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis escalated from a level one to 
three. After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI increased from a level two to a level four.  
 In Case 2, the level of diplomatic conflict before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was 
measured at a level one. The ROC and the PRC began to communicate with each other 
through the creation of the SEF and ARATS. After the 1999 Confrontation, the level of 
diplomatic conflict decreased from level two to level one. Before the Third Taiwan Strait 
Crisis the level of military conflict was measured at level two, while in the aftermath of 
second incident it was observed at level three. This was in part due to the provocative 
rhetoric and actions of DPP President Chen. He helped to end the 1999 Taiwan 
Confrontation, but increasingly expressed his pro-independence views. This provoked further 
military exercises by the PLA. Before the first incident in the 1990s, TPI reached level four.  
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 According to the PE Model, I expected the levels of diplomatic and military conflict 
to be the tails on either side of the two conflicts in each case. I expected the level of TPI to 
react to the levels of diplomatic and military conflict within the confines of the existing 
relationships and obligations to one another. Since the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises 
occurred in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, the levels of military and diplomatic 
conflict before and after Case 1 were higher than in Case 2. The level of TPI in Case one 
increased in reaction to the rising level of military and diplomatic conflict, but after the 
crises, continued to increase. This was due to the dependence of Taiwan on the United States 
and the militaristic leadership of Chian Kai-shek.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist 
despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium 
from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is 
comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or 
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of 
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting 
mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. According to this 
model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will 
increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Political 
scientist, Weixing Hu discussed the PE Model in relation to the Taiwan Strait, but did not 
execute a rigorous methodology that reflected the theory. This study illustrates how the 
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Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium could be applied to the case of China and Taiwan in a 
more methodical way than in Weixing Hu’s study.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 Originally a model of evolutionary biology, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones conceptualized the model of punctuated equilibrium in the context of political science. 
Their model was broad enough to use as a framework into which other theories could fit. The 
goal of their study was to examine the dramatic policy changes that “regularly occur in 
American politics, even if most issues most of the time are characterized by more routine 
developments.”495 The reason this model interested me in relation to the Taiwan Strait, was 
that it offered a multifaceted framework to explain both long periods of stasis amid short 
cycles of rapid disruption. Other theories that have been used to describe the political 
deadlock across the Taiwan Strait, such as balance of power politics and complex 
interdependence theory only explain part of the longitudinal phenomenon of political 
stalemate. One large drawback of Baumgartner and Jones’ PE model was the lack of a 
coherent methodological framework. Depending on the specific area of research, the 
measures and methodological approach changed. Their anthology of works included 
statistical studies of American policy change. I sought to apply this model to international 
relations in the form of case study research.  
 Political scientist Weixing Hu attempted to use the PE Model to explain cycles of 
change and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He defined the negative feedback cycle as the 
“growing economic interdependence, domestic constraints in Taiwan, economic development 
                                                
495 Baumgartner and Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” p. 3. 
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and peaceful unification strategy of Beijing, and Washington’s concerns about peace and 
stability in East Asia and its leverage over Taipei and Beijing.”496 The elements of positive 
feedback included in his study are: the role of issue cycles and impulsive drivers for 
change.497 Weixing Hu sections off the history of the Taiwan Strait into three broad time 
periods which each included a period of change and détente. His three case studies do not 
follow a set format, but are short summaries of only the events that support his claims.   
 In this study I endeavored to correct the loose method of Weixing Hu and establish a 
systematic approach for applying the PE Model to case study research. I illustrated how the 
PE Model could be used to develop a codebook to examine historical cases. My process is 
highly replicable, unlike that of Weixing Hu. If another scholar were to repeat my study, they 
would find similar results. I believe future studies that implement the PE Model should be 
similarly systematized. In the process of combing through historical documents and coding 
specific events, this method safeguards against cherry-picking history to support a 
hypothesis.   
 I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between China and 
Taiwan increased, then the level of negative feedback from the United States would increase, 
resulting in a lower level of conflict. I operationalized the independent variable as Chinese 
and Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruption on three-point nominal scales. The 
intervening variable was also made up of four parts: U.S. diplomatic and military opposition 
to both China and Taiwan. I operationalized the dependent variable as the level of military 
conflict, the level of diplomatic conflict, and the level of third party involvement, each on a 
four-point nominal scale. 
                                                
496 Hu, “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations,” p. 934. 
497 Ibid., p. 953. 
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 I implemented two theory-guided case studies. My first case encompassed the 
positive feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second 
case discussed the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. I 
measured the independent and intervening variables over five time periods in each case: in 
the two years before the first crisis, during the first crisis, the time in between, during the 
second crisis, and in the two years following the second crisis. I measured the dependent 
variable within the two years before and in the two years following the independent and 
intervening variable measures.  
 
FINDINGS 
 Through this research, I found evidence to support my hypothesis according to the PE 
Model. As the level of disruption from both China and Taiwan increased, the United States 
increased their opposing influence and/or forces in order to achieve a lower level of conflict 
than during the crisis situations. The variable measures for both cases were different due to 
changing circumstances and relationships. China became a superpower and Taiwan 
democratized in the span of time between my two cases. 
 As the level of disruption increased, the level of U.S. involvement increased. As was 
discussed in the Analysis section of this chapter, Case 1 encompassed the First (1954-55) and 
the Second (1958) Taiwan Strait Crises and Case 2 included the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
(1995-96) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. In Case 1, Chinese and Taiwanese military 
disruption were the most important components of the independent variable while in Case 2, 
the diplomatic disruption of Taiwan and the military disruption of China were the most 
important factors. In Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was the most important 
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element of the intervening variable, while in Case 2, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan 
was most significant. Despite these differences, I found evidence to support my hypothesis: 
as Taiwanese and Chinese disruption to the system increased, so did U.S. opposition to this 
disruption.  
 The point of deviation for my hypothesis has to do with the dependent variable: the 
resultant level of conflict. I will discuss the particulars of this limitation later in this chapter. 
The resultant level of conflict in both cases did not match the level of conflict before the two 
instances of positive feedback. This had to do with the way my methodology was written. 
Despite this setback, my study is still significant. In establishing a more systematized 
methodology for the application of the PE Model, I unintentionally limited the scope of 
possible observations. My framework is limiting, but no one has attempted to do this before.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
 There are several limitations to my study that I must acknowledge and discuss. Many 
of these limitations are inherent in case study research. Some of the components of my 
independent and intervening variables have many data points, while others only have a few.  
However, the written records available to me restricted my research.  
 A second limitation of my study was the oversimplification of the United States as the 
only actor invested in the negative feedback cycle of incremental policy change. In reality, 
every actor in the system acted in some instances as a balancer and as a destabilizer.  For 
instance, in Case 2, the actions and rhetoric of Presidents Lee and Chen were destabilizing, 
while the line of negotiation between ARATS and SEF was a force of stability. 
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 Another inherent drawback of case study research is the inability to control for 
historical events external to the study. I was not able to control for the increased tensions that 
occurred due to the Chinese Civil War or the additional pressures of the Cold War in Case 1. 
I did, however, repeatedly acknowledge these events as influential to my findings. 
 A fourth limitation of my study was the chosen bounds of my variables. History and 
conflicts in particular are not guided by averages. Each is unique in the time it takes a crisis 
to erupt and dissipate. Instead of using dates to define when I measure my variables, it would 
have been more beneficial to use events common to both cases to define the time periods of 
each of my variables. For instance, the dependent variable of the level of conflict in Case 2 
was still rising in the specified time frame due to the provocative leadership of DPP President 
Chen. Not until pro-status quo President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008, was a period of 
détente reestablished in cross-Strait relations. 
 Despite these limitations, such a systematized application of the PE Model has not 
been tried before in case study research. These limitations could be improved upon in future 
research. 
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Future researchers who use the PE Model in case study research should strive to 
implement a systematized approach. Designing a codebook using nominal scales, defining 
timeframes of variables based on common events, and implementing a precise lateral 
comparison of the cases are lessons future scholars might glean from this work. 
 In the process of conducting research I discovered several avenues of thought which 
could be interesting to further research, but which did not fit into the scope of this study. 
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First, the role of public opinion in Taiwan and domestic divisions, which influenced 
Taiwan’s foreign policy would be an interesting area of study. There exist divisions between 
Taiwan natives and Chinese immigrants to the island that found expression in political 
parties in the 1990s. These divisions become especially important in election years.  
 Another possible area of research is the applicability of the PE Model to the growing 
economic interdependence of Taiwan and China. Economic measures are slower acting than 
diplomatic or military actions that can seem rash and fast. Baumgartner and Jones combined 
the concepts of negative feedback and deep structure in the PE Model. Connie Gersick on the 
other hand tries to separate these concepts while comparing the PE Model across several 
different disciplines. 
 The issue of deep structure is an interesting one.  Gersick defines deep structure as, “a 
network of fundamental, interdependent ‘choices,’ of the basic configuration into which a 
system’s units are organized, and the activities that maintain both this configuration and the 
system’s resource exchange with the environment. Deep structure in human systems is 
largely implicit.”498 I had an idea that deep structure in relation to the Taiwan Strait or more 
broadly to international relations could be related to identity politics and the study of 
nationalism and national identity. That state is also defined by the relationships it chooses to 
enter into and how it maintains them. These identities and relationships change only 
incrementally over time due to multiple layers of constructed limitations. When these 
definitions do change, it is a rapid process largely due to attention shift and mimicking. 
 
                                                
498 Gersick, “Revolutionary Change Theories,” p. 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This study illustrates how the model of punctuated equilibrium can be used in case 
study research. The Taiwan Strait deadlock can be explained using this model. As the level 
of Chinese and Taiwanese disruption to the system increases, the level of U.S. opposition to 
this disruption increases, to eventually reinstitute stability. In recent news, voters in Taiwan 
elected Tsai Ing-wen, their first woman president and Democratic Progressive Party member. 
Her leadership of the independence-minded DPP and her refusal to accept the “One China 
principle” will make it difficult for Tsai to manage Taipei’s relationship with Beijing.499 She 
has made it clear that she wants to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and is unlikely to 
reverse the policies of the Ma Administration. Following Tsai’s election, Xinhua News 
released a commentary in which it warned that “if the DPP and Tsai promote ‘peaceful 
Taiwan independence’ or ‘de jure Taiwan independence,’ they will become ‘troublemakers’ 
in cross-Strait relations, jeopardizing Taiwan’s stability and development.”500 Xinhua went on 
to warn the Tsai Administration to learn from the mistakes of Chen Shui-bian, the last DPP 
president who stirred up trouble across the Taiwan Strait. Will these new developments lead 
to greater stability or further disruption? Who knows, but the deadlock continues nonetheless.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
499 Michael Mazza, “Tsai Ing-wen and Cross-Strait Tensions,” The Diplomat, 29 January 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tsai-ing-wen-and-cross-strait-tensions/ (accessed March 16, 2016). 
500 Bo Zhiyue, “Beijing’s Advice for Tsai Ing-wen,” The Diplomat, 18 January 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/beijings-advice-for-tsai-ing-wen/ (accessed March 16, 2016). 
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